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**PCB Leaders in Exile Project**

**Policy, Action, Objectives**



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PCB LEADERS IN EXILE PROJECT  
POLICY, ACTION, OBJECTIVES

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## PCB LEADERS IN EXILE PROJECT POLICY, ACTION, OBJECTIVES

### Introduction: 'PCB Faces Democracy'

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 1 (Special Supplement)

[Text] Early in 1964, Luis Carlos Prestes, the perennial secretary general of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)--as reported at the time and not denied--announced that he and his comrades were already in the government even though they had not yet achieved power. The subtlety escapes the common mortals not versed in the sometimes esoteric Marxist dialectic, but what did not escape anyone was the humility with which the erstwhile celebrated Knight of Hope appeared on Brazilian television about a month ago to admit that in those distant times he and his party had committed a serious error of assessment of forces.

Fifteen years later, Prestes and his comrades in the PCB leadership are not only distant from the power they sought and the government they imagined they had entered, but even from the country where they should be carrying out their political action. They were difficult years, but the simple possibility that he would again speak over television was a marked indication that they were beginning to improve, and not only from the viewpoint of the communist. Because the proposition to rebuild the democratic regime, the defeat of which in 1964 can be largely credited to Prestes and his followers, was assuming clearer and clearer shape in Brazil. And that is exactly what is being discussed today at the high levels of the PCB command as the convocation of its seventh congress is being prepared namely: How can the communists coexist with democracy and survive under the sun and in the pure air of freedom if the plan for a democratic opening sponsored by the government of General Joao Figueiredo applies to them some day?

Relaxed and in good spirits as well as interested in dispelling the speculation that is rife today in the Brazilian left regarding those polemical discussions that allegedly are dividing the leaders in exile into closed groups, two of them saw fit to resort to a simplistic formula, almost in the nature of a caricature, to explain:

"Look, it is nothing new or very important. It is a discussion as old as Brazil, as old as socialism, perhaps as old as the world. On one side there are the 'civilists' (in a majority position), and in the other corner, there are the 'militarists.'" Or, plagiarizing a bit the analysis of a great, modern essayist: it is the debate between the 'Prussian way' (Lenin, Lukacs) and the 'revolution-restoration' (Gramsci)."

Obviously, the internal debate at the PCB Central Committee level is not that simple. It is not limited only to a reconception, and the acceptance of democracy as a tactical, instrumental stage or a strategic and definitive option for the advance to socialism (a goal that no communist renounces without ceasing to be a communist) is far from settled.

Who is against whom? How does one characterize those opposing forces? When giving that answer, the whole communist leadership in exile again becomes consolidated. It again assumes a position of "monolithic discretion." At the most, they advise those who speculate: "Do not continue to say that it is a mutiny against the 'Old Man,' against Captain Prestes and his daughter."

From the most careful reading of the five interviews we are publishing today--all of them with primary figures in the confrontation taking place among the PCB leadership abroad--a reasonable indication of that picture appears to emerge. The repudiation of a coupist tradition, of sectarianism, impatience, recourse to armed struggle, dogmatism, leftism and an authoritarian posture (by many identified with despotism) of the PCB, unites all of them. The fear of a return to the isolation of the party, of seeing it again in Brazil thinking, deciding and acting in the name of the masses without listening to them, without feeling them, appears to be the fear of someone who has learned something in the last 15 years capable of rallying and uniting all of its leadership.

The differences assume clear shape--in the picture drawn in their own words by the communist leaders consulted--when defining the compatibility of democracy with socialism, or of stipulating the process and style of political democracy for Brazil.

Anita Leocadia Prestes appears to be an exception to the rule, in preaching a "socialist democracy." (Only it, says Anita, can assure the exercise of all democratic rights to the broadest masses of our people). But even in that preaching, she admits reservations: "Obviously, all that does not mean that I am setting the socialist revolution as an immediate objective. The great problem lies precisely in finding the road to socialism under Brazilian conditions." With regard to the use of armed struggle in the advance toward socialism, Anita again differs from the other four interviewed. Anita says that "If it is possible to avert armed struggle, that will be the best... But I believe that the conditions do not yet exist in the Brazilian situation to discount that type of struggle in advance."

Older, more experienced, certainly more tested in direct work with the PCB rank-and-file and with the workers, Giocondo, Guedes, Hercules and Zuleica almost peremptorily exclude recourse to armed struggle. They assume and express a position that is prevalent today among almost all those who--to use a slang expression they have incorporated in the political vocabulary of the party--"learned to have 'body play' [jogo de corpo]."

To what degree is the exceptional, almost isolated position of Anita reflected in the exercise of leadership by Luis Carlos Prestes, her father? Anita is an adult woman, with a strong temperament and personality. She does what she can in order not to be viewed and respected in the party merely as Prestes' daughter. She is sensitive, reacts energetically against those who confuse her situation as a politician with that of a daughter.

But the fact is that her positions cannot fail to have a repercussion--positively or negatively--on Prestes' command. I heard the most reasonable, human and sincere confirmation of that "objective fact" from an old philosopher, an unconditional friend of Luis Carlos Prestes, one of the most respected leaders of the PCB.

"And how could it not influence? In the first place, you must remember that Prestes was always a loner," said the old leader. "Even within the party, he had few faithful friends. Besides, he was always the victim of great treachery. Consequently, he is a man who learned to be very distrustful. Then there is the question of age: with the years, Prestes' distrust grew excessively, even, or especially, regarding those who surround him. Looking, looking... who is left for Prestes to believe, to trust? People of his own flesh, a daughter like Anita who, incidentally, is not just any daughter, with the kind of life she had and who, even in her affiliation, identifies herself with the 'Old Man.'"

The question of Prestes' age raises another that is not looked at indifferently by the leaders of the PCB. At age 81 years, even the "Knight of Hope" would be old for a party that must begin everything all over again; to lead a struggle for its recreation, its reintegration in a complex situation such as the Brazilian situation.

In one of the most commented on interviews (with the magazine ISTO E), Prestes not long ago practically rejected the idea of voluntary retirement. Quoting Anatole France, he said that revolutionaries should die like butterflies. After a meeting of the Central Committee, a comrade sarcastically reminded him that "butterflies die butting their heads, a prospect that should worry the party today more than ever."

Prestes did not like the sarcasm but neither did he change his mind. The greatest concession he makes in that discussion about the timeliness of a younger leadership is to agree that, if nothing major transpires, the comrades can decide on his replacement. He would never represent an obstacle to a decision of that kind.

At the forthcoming seventh congress (perhaps early next year already with all of the leadership of Brazil) it is quite possible the problem of a broad renovation of the whole party leadership may be considered. Many do not exclude the possibility that someone may propose the establishment of a presidency for Luis Carlos Prestes.

"But who would do it?" another old guard leader asked me. "The truth is," he added, "that Prestes will be the secretary, the supreme and incumbent leader as long as he wants, or lives. Because the fact is that he is still very big within the party. Bigger than all of us. There are still a lot of people who identify the PCB with Prestes. Many people who do not even want to hear about a PCB without him."

#### Interview With Armenio Guedes

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 2 (Special Supplement)

[Text] A Bahian from the interior, from Lavras in the Diamantina Plateau, 61 years of age, 44 years a member of the PCB, Armenio Guedes is a pure intellectual, a law graduate, long active in journalism (he was director of IMPRENSA POPULAR at the time of the invasion and closing of the newspaper in 1948). He is one of the 18 members of the Central Committee and has spent 8 years in exile, initially in Chile and, after the fall of Salvador Allende, wandering over the two Europes. Cordial, discreet possessor of a surprising memory, a Bahian who is very much a Carioca, fanatic and irrational only when he talks about the Botafogo, he was one of the communist leaders who attributed the greatest consequences to this period of exile.

Above all in the rigid selfcriticism he makes, especially of his own ideas and of all his political action; few were as incisive, clear and categorical as Armenio Guedes in responding to this simple question: Did you and the party always support the concept of democracy that is today more widespread and accepted by the leadership?

"No. I believe that that is a gain that belongs to our party, not to me. I believe that there was a certain time when we identified democratic gains with the power of the bourgeoisie. But the truth is that little by little life began to show us that democracy is something important, permanent for the progress of society, for progress toward socialism itself. And



today our task is to formulate that connection between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism in a more precise manner without disassociating those two important moments in the struggle of our people toward progress, toward a future of social justice and peace."

[Question] When you speak of democracy, are you referring to the most open and broadest possible multiparty system?

[Answer] Obviously. At least that is how I conceive democracy in Brazil today. In saying this, I do not want in any way--as the PCB already said--to hide the fact that the concepts that are circulating explicitly or implicitly among the various elements of the opposition are identical. For the communists, the struggle for political democracy, for its preservation and broadening is an integral part of the struggle for socialism, for socialist democracy. Thus, our concept goes beyond--to the extent that it preserves and raises to a higher level--the formal institutions of liberal democracy. We are convinced of the need --once the dictatorship has been defeated--to formulate and apply a program of democratic development of the economy that will progressively eliminate the power of the monopolies, of imperialism and of the large landowners, thus placing development at the service of the working masses, of the middle wage-earning classes, of the farmers, and the national small and medium businessmen. But those measures can only be implemented, obviously, if they are sustained by the stimulation and permanent mobilization of all the organized forces of the people, only with that mobilization capable of insuring a majority consensus in the struggle against reaction will it be possible to defeat the monopolies and at the same time to avoid the dangers of a counteroffensive capable of leading to the destabilization of the country and the consequent return to new authoritarian regimes.

[Question] What do you hope from the return to Brazil?

[Answer] My hopes pertain to the effort made by our party during all these years of military dictatorship, a dictatorship of a fascist type, as we communists always characterized it. Our effort was always aimed at mobilizing the great masses of our country, raising the political awareness of our people, stimulating their love of freedom with the aim of liquidating that dictatorship and replacing it with a regime of broad democratic freedoms. Therefore, my hope today, when the symptoms of the decline of the dictatorship are obvious (which I insist on not considering liquidated, terminated; in my opinion, it is a dictatorship that still seeks to reform itself), is to find a democratic solution for our people. And our struggle for democratic freedoms today is not merely a struggle for a tactical nature, it is also of a strategic nature. We will do everything to transform the end of that dictatorship, its liquidation, into the achievement of a regime of democratic freedoms, political freedoms and democracy that will be translated into a broad democratic reorganization of Brazilian society. We do not intend to use democracy or that struggle for democratic freedoms today



to impose a type of government that is antidemocratic tomorrow--what many people, some poorly informed, others intentionally, seek to attribute to the Communist Party. We really want that regime of broad democratic freedoms because for us that is the privileged terrain where the class struggles are waged, where the policies of various groups are defined. We hope through that confrontation to gain the majority for the solutions that we propose today, and in the long term, for the achievement of socialism.

[Question] And what of the apprehensions you must be feeling about the forthcoming return?

[Answer] Those apprehensions have very real bases. They are apprehensions that stem from the authoritarian background of the Brazilian dominant class. They are apprehensions that are based on the anticommunism that has been instilled for so many years, especially during the last 15 years of the dictatorial regime, through all the existing information media in the country, completely monopolized by the most reactionary forces of our society. This often creates misunderstanding and obstacles and impedes the democratic reorganization of Brazilian society. So, that reorganization is really going to require clear-thinking as well as boldness on our part. Because it is a difficult struggle, errors may be committed, and we will have to pay dearly for them. They could imply retrogression, a counter-tendency to that natural movement, to that natural convergence of all the forces that exist at this time, toward achieving political democracy in our country.

[Question] What is the error you fear most that the PCB may commit if it regains legal status?

[Answer] I do not think it is a question of an error that the Communist Party may commit, despite the fact that it is not exempt from the possibility of committing errors. It is quite probable that the Communist Party will commit errors. The effort that we of the leadership and all communists must make is to insure that the party does not contribute the destabilization of Brazilian political life--a destabilization that could be caused by a radical, untimely position that does not correspond to the real balance of forces, to the real possibilities for advance in society; a destabilization which would bring about a regrouping, a polarization of the forces of the right and, consequently, a return to the arbitrary regime, to an authoritarian regime in our country--in short, to avoid social tensions that lead to an unfavorable disruption of the workers movement and the democratic forces in general, as occurred in March 1964.

[Question] It is frequently said that the left in general and the communist parties in particular (not only in the Brazilian case) always had a "ghetto" tendency. Do you agree and do you fear that that may be repeated by you?

[Answer] I think so. I agree. When we consider it historically, I agree that that tendency did exist. But I would like to stress the following: during the 15 years of dictatorship that our country went through, our party, among the antifascist, antidemocratic, and antidictatorial forces, gave an example that little by little it is trying to rectify itself. Little by little it sought and it seeks to get rid of, in other words, to free itself of that "ghetto" tendency. When after 1964, especially after 1968 and even a little before (in 1967), when we held our sixth congress, we waged a struggle not only within the ranks of the party but outside of them, among the forces that opposed the dictatorship, we waged a real battle from the ideological point of view, and quite a tough one, against that "ghetto." The truth is that many of those groups which we characterize as ultraleftist groups, forces or tendencies did not believe in a force of resistance by the people to the regime that had assumed power in 1964. They had a desperate view of the situation. They wanted to confront it from voluntarist positions. They believed that through the creation of a nucleus [foco] of urban or rural guerrillas--without the proper conditions existing for this, and time proved that they did not exist--they could defeat the dictatorship. Thus, they abandoned the slow and patient work of creating a mass movement of resistance to the dictatorship, possible even under the conditions of repression existing in our country. And our party, on the contrary, opted for channeling its efforts toward creating that mass movement. For example, when many forces which called themselves leftist believed that conditions did not exist to work in the unions, we, on the contrary, said that that could be done. Because the unions, even under the intervention of the police, the Ministry of Labor, even with government stooges in their leadership posts, should not be abandoned by the workers. They should make their demands there, transforming the unions into instruments for the defense of those demands and at the same time instruments of resistance to the dictatorship. We knew that we were at a defensive moment, a moment of defensive struggle. We had suffered a defeat; we had to regroup our forces; we had to gather them, resisting the policy of the dictatorship. We had the conviction that sooner or later the moment would come when that resistance would be transformed into a general movement of opposition to the dictatorship, into an offensive movement against it, which is more or less the moment we are approaching (although I do not feel convinced that we are already in that offensive). The essential fact is that today it is understood that that patient and prolonged resistance created the conditions that now make possible the departure of the dictatorship and the achievement of a democracy, of a regime of broad democratic freedoms for our people.

[Question] In Latin America, Chile, Argentina and even Uruguay are pointed out as examples of the incompetence of the left, that is, the inability always attributed to the left to join together or to carry out a democratic process. Do you believe that risk still exists today in Brazil?

[Answer] The fact is that the left has always worked in Latin America under quite difficult conditions. There are many obstacles to be overcome. I do not want to speak for the left of other countries, but let us take the case of Brazil. For example, in 1964 something happened very similar to what was repeated in Chile 10 years later. There was an advance by the democratic forces and a national awakening of consciousness. That movement was even reflected in power. It cannot be denied that the Joao Goulart government had the characteristics of a government of resistance to imperialism. In addition to that, it sought to carry out some changes in the life of the country. That movement obviously provoked a reaction against it, a grouping of the reactionary forces of the right which saw it tending to lead Brazilian society toward a great advance, to take a step forward. And what was our position there? I have the impression that we, members of the party, who had the clearest position among the forces of the left (I do not hesitate to say that, although I do not do so arrogantly), we let ourselves become enmeshed in a coupist policy. We wanted to transform a struggle that should have been prolonged into an immediate conquest. We took the beginning of a process for the end. And we proposed unrealistic tasks for the moment, skipping over stages, underestimating the feelings, the awareness, the willingness and the organization of the masses. The result of that was that we isolated ourselves and were beaten. That is, we isolated ourselves from the large forces that could be allies and thus prevent the rightist coup in the making, which was being prepared for a long time.

[Question] In the recent years you have lived in exile, you of the party leadership have certainly had the time and opportunity to formulate the political line of the PCB, especially on the basis of the prospects created by an amnesty. What is it?

[Answer] As long as the leadership of our party could remain in the country, it stayed there. It stayed in the country until 1975. As you know, during 1974 and 1975 the party suffered brutal repression. Many of its leaders, perhaps half of the regular members of the Central Committee, disappeared. We believe that those individuals were murdered by the organs of repression of the dictatorship. Therefore, it was only 4 years ago that we reorganized abroad by virtue of a contingency that forced us to do so. The important thing was that the party not be left without leadership. As for the second part, I would say that our line was not formulated now, abroad. It is a continuation of the general line formulated at the Sixth PCB Congress, a line that our Central Committee at its recent meeting (June 1979) once again considered basically correct. Obviously, Brazil changed, the situation changed; that line has to be enriched, it has to be broadened, but on the basis of correct things it has stressed; of a correct concept it had of the course of the struggle of our country's working class. I would say that in those years abroad what really occurred was an enrichment, a closer approximation between that line and the Brazilian situation. That is, in formulating our political proposals, we considered the important changes observed in Brazil.

[Question] Have those changes created conditions for a peaceful transition toward socialism?

[Answer] I would say that those changes and the level of resistance shown by Brazilian society to the dictatorship in large measure facilitated that course without an armed struggle, which is not at all a course without struggle. It will be a course of struggle, a course in which large obstacles will have to be overcome, a course that is going to demand great effort and leadership capability, not only on the part of the communists but on the part of all the forces of the workers movement and the democratic movement; a very great effort, very great skill, clear-thinking, intelligence in order that that possibility may become a reality. But I believe that historically our people are being given an opportunity, and we must transform it into a conquest, into a democratic road to socialism. Obviously, we all aspire to improve the conditions of the people with the least suffering possible for the people themselves. That is what any revolutionary should aspire to after 15 years of dictatorship.

[Question] What objective goals does the leadership of the PCB plan to pursue immediately after it arrives in Brazil?

[Answer] We are going to correctly set the time when that will happen. When we arrive in Brazil legally it is because the situation has changed. That arrival is significant in itself. It means that democratic areas have been gained in Brazil, even though we do not consider that those areas correspond fully to the political democracy we all aspire to in place of the present regime. Our objective then, our immediate objective is going to be to join the political struggle to expand those areas so that, being broadened, they will reach a point when it will be possible to put a final end to the present regime and to achieve a political situation qualitatively different from the present one, in which political democracy will prevail; a regime in which it will be possible to organize political parties, in which the free possibility will exist for the autonomous organization of the unions, of the various social organizations and forces; in short, a regime that will enable the people to discuss their problems widely and to find the solution to their problems without paternalism. It is obvious that that must be expressed, at a later stage, in something as important as may be the convocation of a Constituent Assembly that will give the country a new basic law, a democratic constitution, because I believe that the existence of a democratic society is incompatible with the present constitution of Brazil. That will be a primary task. In addition, we must strive to clear the way for this by putting an end to everything that is a reminder of 15 years of dictatorship. We must strive for example, to liquidate the organs of repression, the Internal Defense Operations Center (CODI), the Department of Domestic Operations (DOI), the operations of armed bands that were the creatures of the dictatorship. And what is more important, to make a



great effort to put an end to the concepts and practice of the so-called "doctrine of national security," which is the core of the fascist ideology that shaped all political life in the country during those years. As can be seen, we will have many important political tasks ahead of us. It is obvious that that is not unconnected with a large-scale reorganization that will be in the nature of a renewal and even a recreation of our party, which we want to be a national, democratic, popular party that will have important national influence, a party that will be a decisive factor in restructuring a strong workers, popular and democratic movement, really capable of influencing the unity of the democratic forces and the destinies of the country in a decisive manner, taking the present circumstances as a point of departure.

[Question] In 1945 the first big battle for the restoration of a democratic regime also began with amnesty. The communists had the most diverse allies in it. Immediately afterwards, the PCB launched the "Constituent Assembly with Vargas" as a watchword. Would it be possible today to repeat a watchword of that type or a constituent assembly with the military?

[Answer] I believe a correction must be made. We did not speak of a Constituent Assembly with Vargas (and I believe that that was to the credit of Prestes upon leaving prison). We spoke purely and simply about the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, without setting as a necessary condition the departure of Getulio Vargas from power. We believed that the steps he had taken in the sense of ceding to the pressure of the democratic forces, of ceding to the pressure of the great movement that spread throughout the country--for its immediate return to democracy--that for all that, Getulio would cease to represent an obstacle to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. On the contrary, it was the reactionary forces that, after having manifested themselves as forces of the right (as was the case of some members of the National Democratic Union (UDN), advocated the overthrow of Getulio. They were the ones who joined with the American ambassador of that time, Adolph Berle, who promoted the coup d'etat of 29 October 1945, removing Vargas from power. We were convinced that at that time the continued stay of Getulio Vargas at the head of the government was in no way an obstacle to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The elections were convened after the fall of Getulio and they could not be avoided in view of the great impetus of the movement that had emerged and spread throughout the country. But that would have happened also, and perhaps under better circumstances, if the 29 October coup had not occurred--which as generally happens with military coups, was a reactionary coup to cut off and limit the movement of the masses that had emerged in 1945.

[Question] And today? With what government would the communists like to see a Constituent Assembly in operation?



[Answer] Today we also believe that if there is a forceful and large mass movement, as it is hoped will occur, nobody will have the power to prevent the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. We are convinced that the armed forces will experience the influence of the general struggle that will be waged throughout the country for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, because there will also be a polarization of the democratic forces there. And it is obvious that the segments or forces within the armed forces that may want to oppose it will tend to be in the minority; consequently they will not have a decisive role in the conduct of the policy of the Brazilian Armed Forces.

[Question] Does that mean that you do not combine the need for a Constituent Assembly with the need for a return of the military to their barracks?

[Answer] No, that is a simplistic formula that does not explain anything. We believe that every military man has the right to participate in political life just as any other Brazilian citizen. What we believe, however, is that the armed forces as such, as an institution, have their specific function. And in a democratic reorganization of Brazilian society, they must exercise their functions, that were always established in Brazilian constitutional tradition, as guardians of national sovereignty. That is also the traditional military doctrine of our country and not what was attributed to it by the so-called "doctrine of national security," which by the way is a doctrine forged in the United States, attributing a secondary function to the armed forces, more of pursuit of a supposed internal enemy. The practice of those 15 years of dictatorship exhaustively demonstrates the fallacy of that doctrine, according to which any force can be considered an "internal enemy." We believe that normalization of the life of the country will inevitably be translated into the normalization of the functions of the armed forces.

[Question] Is it possible today to foresee and identify in the Brazilian political panorama a preferred ally or group of allies for the PCB?

[Answer] Yes. I believe that for a vanguard and workers party such as ours the question of alliances is a capital one. The isolation or wrong view of a policy of alliance leads any revolutionary party to failure, to defeat. In the broad combination of political forces of the Brazilian opposition, there are some that are preferred allies. We believe that once the democratic freedoms have been attained, our effort must be aimed at forming the widest possible spectrum of forces in defense of the freedoms gained. Obviously, we will try to approach all of those forces. Naturally, those that are more closely linked with the popular masses, especially the working masses, the parties that are more identified and linked with them, will be our preferred allies because they will be characteristically more consistent forces. We, for example, are fighting, not only in the future, but already today to maintain contacts and alliances with all those forces

that are beginning to take shape and beginning to have influence on the workers movement, on the democratic movement. We will seek to have contacts with the forces of the Catholic Church, with the various forces of the labor movement, etc; with all those who, in principle and as a matter of principle, resisted the dictatorship and now struggle for the democratization of the country. In short, that determination will also be the product of a political process that will develop in Brazil. Our reference point for those alliances will also be the position of those forces for or against the legalization of our party, for or against the maintenance of the democratic regime, toward the workers and union movement, the basic freedoms. Those will be our reference points to establish our system of alliances. Therefore, we do not agree with some elements in the opposition movement that, instead of postulating the need to create a broad bloc or front of democratic forces, are fighting at the present time for a narrow leftist front. That would be isolation, and isolation for a workers and vanguard party such as the PCB is the certain road to defeat.

#### Interview With Giocondo Dias

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 3 (Special Supplement)

[Text] Giocondo Dias is 66 years old, 45 as a party member, 33 as a member of the Central Committee. He was the one who hesitated and reflected the most before deciding to speak to a reporter. He took 3 days to think it over. He is above all a "party organization man," to whom the planning and execution of its security system was always entrusted, especially that of Luis Carlos Prestes, a task that was given to him more than 30 years ago in view of his success as commander of the Natal military insurrection in 1935.

Nobody has forgotten that for 4 days and nights the capital and almost all of the state of Rio Grande de Norte were dominated and governed by "Corporal Dias" and the soldiers who rebelled with him in obedience to the orders of "General Prestes."

Giocondo Dias' silence is explained by the fear of saying things that may be misinterpreted, jeopardizing the cohesion and harmony of the party, such a great preoccupation of his that he even came to be called "the great mute," a title that would suit well a Bahian from Salvador with a strong, twangy Northeastern accent--a widower, always watching his blood sugar because of diabetes. He responds to that appellation: "That is not quite true, because the fact is that there were never many opportunities for me to speak out; because I never failed to say what I thought in the Central Committee. Whenever there was a congress, I wrote. Whenever that was called for or an opportunity presented itself, I wrote an article or two. But since I am not educated, I do not have great facility in writing much."

He enjoys great authority within the party. All regard him and Gregorio Bezerra as two sensitive and autonomous moderators.

[Question] When did you begin to study Marxism?

[Answer] It would be a great pretension on my part to say that I studied Marxism. I read, I continue to read. Before the 1930 movement, I read my first book, a book by Maria Lacerda de Moura, "Civilizacao Tronco de Escravos" ['Civilization, Family Tree of Slaves'], which impressed me greatly. Maria Lacerda de Moura was an anarchist. A few days later, my second reading was a speech by Stalin to the Red Army. That was all of my first theory. I continued in the movement out of an obligation to fight for my comrades who were imprisoned, because of the commitments I had assumed. But I did not have a scientific justification. It was after 1939-40 that I began to have an idea of historic development from a book that an illiterate gave me, "A Historia do Trabalho" [The History of Labor]. Up to that point, the idea I had and which animated me was to carry out a revolution prepared by a good conspiracy. The man who gave me that book was an old revolutionary. He worked with me and knew more than I did and began to combat my concept of the revolutionary process. As always, I was curious, I continued to read things, attending discussions, listening to people who knew more than I did. People who, seeing my interest, took an interest in me and always helped me.

[Question] You were the last leader of the PCB to leave Brazil. It is said for a year and a half you were practically the principal party leader in Brazil. Was it difficult for you to obey the order to leave the country?

[Answer] That is a fact, I left the country in compliance with orders. Other comrades had been arrested, many had disappeared. I had to stay there for some time; which was no great merit, I had no place to go. The captain does not abandon the ship when it is sinking. The fact is that I left for three reasons: the first, because I like life very much; the second, because I felt that there already was a leadership abroad and it was not fair to stay; and the third, I had to give an accounting. But not to be hypocritical, I left because I really wanted to, because I felt the "heavy bar," because there was every possibility of my "catching hell." They asked me if I wanted to leave and I said yes immediately. They asked me when I could leave and I replied within 2 months. They took me out 4 months later. Only because of the special care of the comrades did I not succumb. They were the ones who took every measure so that I could stop "operating," first because of my health, and second because of the responsibilities I continued to have in the party. Funds were given to organize my security. I took the efficiency of the enemy very seriously. Finally, I was lucky. But what I want to say even today is that I owe my survival, my very life, to that solidarity of the comrades. Even of some who were arrested, even of those who later behaved badly. At least two of them could have "opened up," could have said where I was because they knew about one or two places

where I should go, and they did not say a word. It is well to say that because that business of being a hero is somewhat of an oddity and very rare. At the moment of planning, executing and securing a withdrawal, a series of factors converge for its success, so that everything comes out right. If those factors are not seriously analyzed everything may seem to be confused with heroism. Dubious heroism.

[Question] Speaking of the future, it is said that the government's amnesty plan will become law by September; a law that will benefit the leaders of the PCB. Is there already a decision by the Central Committee in exile about what to do?

[Answer] No such decision has been made. Personally I cannot make any decision but I can have an opinion. First of all, I believe that that amnesty should be broad and unrestricted; it should embrace all those persecuted and sentenced by the dictatorship. At the same time, I believe that in a certain way, the power structure was forced to grant that amnesty. We should use it as a basis to secure more. I believe we should return to Brazil. In Brazil we will be able to secure more. We should return and do as much as possible to become legalized, to fight for that right to live like any other citizen.

[Question] When does the leadership in exile plan to confront the question of returning?

[Answer] I have no idea but it should be soon.

[Question] Should that party, which has the prospect of regaining legal status, be recycled, renewed or recreated?

[Answer] It must be a party linked to the masses, a party that reflects the interests of the Brazilian people, especially of the Brazilian working class. That was always our object. Today more than ever it must, needs to, cannot fail to, reflect that Brazilian working class, a class that has changed very much in the last 15 years.

[Question] And what do you plan to do about the intellectuals, the middle class, unload them?

[Answer] The fact that we are a party of the working class and that we fight to link ourselves to it does not mean that we must detach ourselves from the intellectuals, nor even from what is called the middle class. It is also important for the intellectuals to see us as their party, a party of new culture and hope.

[Question] Outside of that concern to link itself ever closer to the working class, what other concerns must the PCB have at the moment of regaining legal status?



[Answer] Legal status is necessary in order that we may be able to combat every tendency to consider us a body foreign to Brazilian society. We have to be part of it, live as it does, seek to understand it, in order to be able to transform it, and especially to seek Brazilian solutions for Brazilian problems.

[Question] Do you believe that up to now the PCB has not done that?

[Answer] Yet it has but it must do it more and better. If a person does not have the right to be satisfied with what he has already done, what should one say about a party, especially a communist party?

[Question] How does the PCB view the emergence of the working class of the multinationals, especially that of the large Sao Paulo industrial centers, such as the ABC?

[Answer] It views it favorably. I can even say that that more skilled worker is the type that comes into the party more easily. That is natural. He is a man who gets to see things, who has the need to see things better. One who never had them, who was always deprived of those certain things, does not feel the need to fight for them. Without wanting to appear pedantic, I will quote Marx. He said that capitalism created its own gravedigger. As it develops, grows, expands, capitalism creates the proletariat who will be in a better position to fight against it, against its exploitation. It is no longer the proletariat of the family enterprises, of management paternalism, who is the pal of the boss, who may even marry his daughter. Another factor that is going to help us is the disappearance of the "caudillos." Getulio no longer exists. The Brazilian worker of today no longer has any reason to wait for the great, protecting hand of the new "fathers of the poor." The 1964 coup had that merit: it contributed to letting the workers see whose side the state is on. During the past 15 years, the state has always been on the side of management. It was never above them or the workers. In the practice of that state, the governments of the last 15 years taught that lesson to the working class, a lesson in politicization.

[Question] But do you not consider Brizola a heir to Vargas and Jango?

[Answer] No, I do not believe so. I believe that Leonel Brizola is a traditional leader but one who will not have the influence of Getulio and Jango on the working class. Brizola has his influence, his prestige in Brazil and it is possible that he will continue to have it for some time, I personally hope so. But in my opinion, he will have a limited area. It will not be a total area.

[Question] What errors must the communists avoid upon their return to Brazil, with or without legal status?



[Answer] We must avoid isolation, which is always a danger for a party. If the political situation is incorrectly assessed, the existing correlation of forces, it will isolate itself. It is well to take a basic thing into consideration: things are moving but we cannot have the idea, the impression, that the arbitrary situation has ended. The need to join efforts, to rally forces, remains; it is something of an imperative. If a party such as ours does not take that into consideration, it will commit a great error. On the other hand, we cannot hold the same position today as 15 years ago, or even 10 or 5 years ago. We have to present ourselves with a unified position that will facilitate the unity of all forces opposed to the dictatorship. Not only unity with the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) but with all the forces that oppose it, and all of that without any intention of leading them. At the same time, we have to reach this conclusion: Brazil demands a great effort from each political force for the purpose of finding a constructive solution. If we do not think and act that way, we will make a mistake.

[Question] What do you understand by "constructive solution?"

[Answer] It is time, along with the political alternative, to think of countering the economic-financial measures with others that unite all those who really want an independent Brazil, the reduction of inflation, state control which instead of leading to denationalization promotes and leads to nationalization, to independence and no longer dependence.

[Question] What is your concept of democracy today, the one the party should adopt?

[Answer] Lenin said the following: "The worker needs democracy in order to struggle." What I believe is that it is really in our interest to have democracy, but not to be used. Naturally we do not want to deceive anybody: we are fighting for socialism, that is the ultimate objective of our party. In the meantime, at this moment, we are fighting for freedom in our country so that there will actually be democracy in order that the people may participate in decisions, can influence them. And that is not at all an easy thing. It is going to be a very hard road in a country where the people rarely participate. That would not be the greatest achievement of our party but, immediately, it can be a great victory for the Brazilian people to which the party has contributed.

[Question] Do you not have some apprehension about a broad debate and confrontation of ideas?

[Answer] It is the party that has no fear, not I. If one of us has that apprehension or even fear, he is distorted. We are not the owners of the truth, but in a debate the one who comes closer to the truth has the advantage. The ones who should be afraid of that debate, of that confrontation,

are those who seek or sought to hide the truth. With all of its errors, our party has been close to the truth with regard to Brazil. Is Brazil independent? It is not. Does that policy that is being carried out by others--by others, by those who consider us enemies, undesirables--lead to independence? Let us see: in 1973 General Medici left the government with a manipulated and compressed inflation rate of approximately 15 percent. General Geisel took over the government with a foreign debt of \$12.5 billion. In 1978 he returned the country over to his successor, General Figueiredo, with an inflation rate of 42 percent and a foreign debt of \$42 billion. In the course of those 5 years, the dream of "Brazil, a power," with predetermined stages and conditions, collapsed. The attempts to control economic performance, the growth of the gross domestic product, inflation, etc, were disastrous. That is the truth. Another characteristic of the Geisel government was the loss of the major, principal, motto of dictatorial governments to maintain their tutelage over the nation: the selfimposed mission of building the country in the image and likeness of the technocrats' fancies. With the discrediting of those plans, General Figueiredo will have to change his position regarding the relationship with society and the attempts to control the activities of the nation. That is my opinion. General Figueiredo inherited that can of worms but he could not have failed to know about it, he was on the inside for a long time.

[Question] Do you not fear a coup, a counteraction to the relaxation--that the regime may be also counting on your incompetence and that of those who are demanding democracy for the country?

[Answer] Of course, if there is no unity, if there is no understanding, if all the forces interested in the struggle do not combine in the quest for a solution to the Brazilian problems, there is no doubt that they will return. Brazil is not an island isolated in the world. Look at what happened in Argentina. I do not believe that in politics, when dealing with the destiny of nations, things can happen exactly as their individuals want. Sometimes in politics, when we achieve 40 percent of what we want or dream of, that is already a great victory.

[Question] Does not that preaching of unity appear a little utopian, especially in a society such as the Brazilian?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, there is something utopian in all of the objectives we yearn for. Unity is not easy, nor a complete and finished thing. It is a process that is not simply concluded, on a given day or moment. It does not end. It occurs, it is built, it is achieved, on different levels, through various stages.

[Question] The world, and particularly Europe, has reached a juncture that indicates a resurgence of the right, stemming among other things from the disintegration and discrediting of the left. Do you not fear that that may also happen in Brazil shortly?

[Answer] What I feel and observe is a readjustment of the struggle. It is important first of all to identify what is the phase of the struggle we are going through. It would be foolish to want today's struggle to be what it was early in the century or in mid-century. Sometimes we are late in understanding that the situation has changed. What I believe, and it seems to me to be easily corroborated, is that the forces of progress are advancing greatly. Today the forces of reactions are resisting, and they are still very strong. The struggle is being waged in all areas in a subtle manner and particularly at the ideological level. All of that has an influence in Latin America regardless of how distant it is. Frankly, I do not believe there has been any resurgence.

[Question] But that is not what the sociologists say.

[Answer] Ah, yes, the sociologists. But there are sociologists who also exaggerate the advances of the other side. Our effort has to be to take a median of that in order to approach the real situation as closely as possible. There is really a danger of not winning that struggle but things today are much better for the people than they were 20 or 15 years ago, especially for the working class. That does not mean that that is the situation or the prospect for Brazil. That is another problem. But in a general way, it is the capitalists who are expiring, who are seeking a middle ground, who are already speaking of people's capitalism, of social democracy, not the communists.

#### Interview With Zuleica Alambert

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 5 (Special Supplement)

[Text] [Question] How many women are there in the leadership of the PCB?

[Answer] Only one, me. Until a short while ago there was also Anita Prestes, but she resigned.

[Question] In the past, how many other women were members of the Central Committee and who were they?

[Answer] As a regular member there was never any other woman. There were six alternate women members, if I am not mistaken, between 1952 and 1953. One of them was Arcelina Mochel, a lawyer, a woman of great capability, who is now deceased. After that, it was no longer possible. Not because of a lack of opportunities but, you know, there are two things that make it difficult for a woman to pursue a political career: one is children and the other is a husband. I never had children, and a husband for me is secondary. I never had anybody to complicate my life.

[JB] That rare woman, the only one among the 20 regular members of the PCB Central Committee since 1947, is Zuleica Alambert. Born in Santos in December 1922, the daughter of a petit-bourgeois father and a farming-background mother, who has been a member of the party for 34 years and is today exiled in Paris.

She was also a rare case in 1946 when at 23 years of age she was elected for Santos, one of the only two women deputies to the Legislative Assembly of Sao Paulo (the other was Conceicao Santamaria) she has been in exile for 8 years (two of them in Chile). Zuleica Alambert unveiled and became within the PCB leadership a staunch defender of a feminist policy, of defense the rights of and the emancipation of women, to be espoused and conducted by a party that she herself admits is "male-oriented."

Embarrassed 'machismo'

[Question] Do you believe that the PCB is ready today to accept a woman as its secretary general?

[JB] Zuleica Alambert, who has just waged a victorious battle, with the approval of a daring Central Committee report on "The Condition of Women in Brazilian Society," does not hesitate:

[Answer] I do not believe it is. But it is well in that reply to take another reality as a point of departure: since we have only one woman today in the Central Committee, it is very difficult to think of a woman as secretary general. I believe that within the party I have attained the high position a woman can attain. The fact is that there is not sufficient quantity to pick out quality. In my opinion the secretary general of the party can be chosen only under two conditions: either he is someone who has a history, a life, something that attracts a whole leadership group, or he is so intellectually brilliant, has such extraordinary ability that he imposes his own credentials. In any case, I believe that our party has to go forward, and certainly go forward in collective leadership, with temporary coordinators of the leadership team.

[Question] In addition to the difficulties that a woman naturally faces in pursuing a political career in Brazil, was not the PCB's "machismo" also an obstacle?

[Answer] The PCB derives from Brazilian society. The men who come to the party are the product of that society, they are reared the same as all the others. So obviously the male-oriented ideas are dominant within the party. Even unconsciously, even without preaching that, even though our ideology takes the equality of rights into account, it is difficult for men's minds to change. One thing is the idea, another is practice. I also encountered much "machismo" in the party. Sometimes a little disguised, embarrassed. I will cite two concrete examples: if there are three congresses of fraternal



parties, I am selected for the least important; if there are three working committees at a meeting, I am always put in the nonpolitical committee, although I consider myself as capable as any man on the Central Committee to cope with the analysis and formulation of political decisions.

[Question] Was it difficult to break that ground in the Central Committee?

[Answer] Initially, to enter the Central Committee, I do not think it was. For a simple reason: the party was emerging from a clandestine status that forced it to be a restricted party of 2,000 cadres or members. Under legal status, it became a party of 150,000 members, with a whole structure of a mass party. There was, therefore, a need to form a leading group rather quickly. I was a very young woman of 23 years of age but I was outgoing and even had influence in the city where I lived. I worked in the library, was in dramatics, belonged to the football club. My father was a man with many connections with mass organizations. I even found time to write and win literary contests. When I came to the party, it did nothing more than utilize a person with certain potentials and it did this at a time when it needed that type of person badly. Since I was (and I believe I still am) a street speaker, that was another factor at the time that facilitated and hastened a certain career within the party.

#### Debate and Compare

[Question] How do you conceive the PCB as a legal party in Brazil?

[Answer] When we live in Brazil, our tendency is to detach ourselves from the external. The departure from Brazil gave me a feeling of breadth, a universal understanding, the existence of a series of experiences, which not being properly and mechanically applicable to our country, opened our minds to so many questions and reflections of a world that is in turmoil. All that led me to consider, to reflect about a question pertaining to our party, which I have the impression must be discussed at the forthcoming congress. The question concerns our clandestine and illegal status. There is no doubt that in large part, it is due to the most obscurantist forces in the country, which were not in a position, did not feel secure enough to absorb us as a legal party operating against them. It was undoubtedly those obscurantist forces that set up the most obstacles against the communists emerging into the light of day and presenting their ideas. That was the primary factor, the most obvious explanation for our clandestine and illegal status, but not the only one. Today seems to be the moment to delve into the identification of other factors. My personal opinion is that it behooves us to examine to what degree we ourselves contributed to the circumstance that Brazilian society did not demand our legalization in a more concrete manner. In that regard, the first thing that comes to mind is to make the PCB a real political party, of political action and execution, for the transformation of Brazilian society. Not a party that lives for itself, contemplating its navel. To the extent that we have that concept



of a party to transform Brazilian society, and not only on the basis of denouncing what is wrong but also presenting solutions for its real problems, we shall have a different posture both from the structural point of view and that of behavior and working method. That change has to occur. In today's Brazilian society, we have to be a party of a profoundly national character, a party that defends the resources of the country, its culture, that takes into account the usages and customs of our people, a party that must have solutions for each segment of civil society. As we tried to do with women, we must have a policy for youth, for the armed forces, for the Church, for the farmers, always keeping in mind the vast changes that the world has undergone, especially Brazilian society, which is not the same as 15 years ago. That must, that will, lead us to use different language. It will also lead us to build a party that knows how to adapt to the others, debate their ideas, a party that does not impose but that compares. Because that is the big problem of our time: we live at a time in which it is important to convince the majority of the correctness of the ideas we defend. And that requires much time and work.

[Question] At one of its recent meetings, the Central Committee approved a resolution on the need for the organization to revise its way of conceiving and executing its policy toward women. In a certain passage of that document, published by VOZ OPERARIA, the PCB admits that "it would be a mistake to think that the achievement of important demands by women will occur only when capitalism is abolished. Is that revisionism?

[Answer] It is realism. Our party is more and more becoming aware that there is a need to gather forces in all sectors so that it may be possible within the system to achieve other demands, other areas. In the case of women, look, for example, at the treatment accorded them by the Code of Labor Laws, which devotes a whole chapter to the protection of women's and child labor. We have well-founded criticism to make about that legislation. There are a number of deficiencies and we recommend and have a number of modifications to suggest. But we do not fail to recognize that the law includes and meets various demands that represent gains achieved by the proletariat, gains made within capitalism. That fact gives us right to believe that in the future, we may have a relatively good Civil Code and Penal Code within the present systems, and laws that will offer better protection to the work of women, a law on sex education in the schools, and on family planning. The attainment of these things do not necessitate the immediate overthrow of the system. And it is through those struggles that the women will be gaining awareness for an understanding of who is their oppressor and how it is, that is, the general system in which they live.

[Question] In the conclusions of that decision, you defend the right to maternity, the right of the couple to decide if it does not want to have children, the dissemination of contraceptive methods, abolition of punitive legislative pertaining to abortion, which should be considered as the last resort in terms of an undesired pregnancy. You take up subjects and assume positions that many consider politically inopportune for a party that seeks to resume legal status, understood and accepted even by the Church and by Brazilian Catholics.

[Answer] When we formulated that position on abortion—a position finally accepted and ratified by our leadership—we really faced a great problem. It was difficult for us. First because as communists we are in favor of free abortion, within certain scientific rules, because abortion cannot be performed at any time. Obviously, our platform not being a transitory thing, takes into consideration the forces and positions present in Brazilian society. In the political discussion of the problem, we believed that it was difficult to present abortion in a radical manner. But it was also impossible to avoid talking about such a serious thing as this, when 2.5 million women of the poorest classes of Brazilian society suffer, pay a very high price, sometimes their very lives, because of the lack of humane and realistic legislation. Two and half million who, according to semi-official estimates have those abortions at the risk of their lives. It was very difficult not to say a word, not to define a position on a problem of that scope. What we seek and hope is that the Church and the Catholics will understand correctly, will not distort what we think and want. The Church and Brazilian Catholics talk very much against abortion in the name of the defense of life. We believe that to defend life also implies a defense of the life of the woman who is going to have a child, of the woman who for economic reasons or especially because of her health cannot have a child. That woman, in our opinion, cannot be punished as she is today because she resorts to an illegal, clandestine abortion, criminally exploited and executed. It was for that reason that we did not present the question of abortion in a more radical way. We did not ask for abolition of the punitive legislation pertaining to abortion for the women of the petit-bourgeoisie, who can do that untroubled in luxurious clinics, under the name of a microcaesarean operation. Our proposal is to defend other more unfortunate, poor women who resort to the industries and butchers that perform the abortion in exchange for a few cruzeiros, frequently tearing up the body and ruining the health of their "victims." As a national, mass, working class party, we cannot continue to accept the fact that 2.5 million Brazilian women a year pierce their uterus with crochet needles, pour acid into themselves, to prevent a child they cannot have. It is not possible that the Church does not understand that that position of ours is also assumed in the name of the right of life.

#### Interview With Hercules Correa

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRAZIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 6 (Special Supplement)

[Text] "Many people have come and continue to come to the party with various shades of sectarian, dogmatic, leftist mentality, without being aware that all of that was defeated and rejected after 1958 by the party itself. Those of petit-bourgeois background or from the urban middle class, particularly, bring or try to bring with them an incorrect understanding of our party. I usually say that those people come, join it, not because they

want to transform society in a revolutionary way but because they want to take revenge on society. All those people need to be convinced that the PCB is not a party of revenge. It is not an instrument for some from the petit-bourgeoisie who tried to become bourgeois and did not succeed because the competition did not let them. It should become well understood that we do not want to take revenge on society but to transform it in a revolutionary manner, as an act of will and decision of the great masses."

That was Hercules Correa speaking, another of the 18 members of the PCB Central Committee and one of the best-known leaders of the General Labor Confederation (CGT) before 1964. "Fat," as everyone calls him, one of the men most sought by the police in Brazil in 1964, whose arrest and death were announced (and even photographed) several times immediately after the fall of Goulart. He is 50 years old, has two children, three grandchildren whom he has not seen, and a wife in Brazil. Time seems to have stood still for him. He still looks the same as he did when he was elected first secretary of the Legislative Assembly of Guanabara, with the votes also of Carlos Lacerda's National Democratic Union (UDN). Aliomar Baleeiro, also a UDN man, used to say: "Do you see that backwoodsman? I do not know how he learned to speak but he never opens his mouth to speak nonsense?"

[Question] What is the story about your death in 1964?

[Answer] All of that was your work, the press, radio and television in Rio. And it seems to have also reached other states because a long time later they told me that that story was also told in Alagoas, Pernambuco, Rio Grande de Norte and Bahia. What happened is that somebody from the police of the old Guanabara government decided to make up and spread that rumor. Perhaps to justify a murder if they should arrest me. The fact is that up to 7 April 1964 I walked around and was seen by many in the streets of Rio. Only when I became aware that the chase was being intensified did I hide out... As far as I can recall, that story lasted until 1966. A TV newscast even showed my body floating in the river at the border of Guanabara and Caxias. In a Heron Domingues news program, they also said that I had been surrounded in a farm in Parana by army troops but had succeeded in escaping miraculously. I was never in Parana although I traveled a lot around Brazil, which I did not leave until June 1974, 10 years after the coup, after the report of my death and after having carried out intense political activity underground.

[Question] Were those 10 years the most difficult and active years in your career as a communist agitator?

[Answer] Perhaps not, because my political work between 1960 and 1964 was enormous. During that period, I had to combine, to invent time to be president of the Union of Workers of the Spinning and Weaving Industry of Rio de Janeiro, chairman of the permanent committee of the Union Organizations

of Guanabara, deputy to the Constituent Assembly (elected with 10,000 votes) and later (1962), state deputy (14,000 votes) on the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) ticket, first secretary of the legislative assembly and leader of the CGT.

[Question] Those were years when you got to know many important people of the kind that you communists consider representatives of the "dominant class." What was your relationship with them?

[Answer] Generally, in almost all cases, it was always cordial and respectful. Many of them later, after the coup, demonstrated their friendship for me. There were even those who offered me houses and places so that I would not fall into the hands of the police and the army. As a member of the constitutional committee, I knew well Temístocles Cavalcanti, Aliomar Baleiro, Roland Corbisier, Paulo Alberto, Sandra Cavalcanti. Many times, I dealt with ministers and with three presidents of the republic: Juscelino, Janio and Jango. The prevailing norm was always one of respectful treatment. Perhaps the only state minister with whom I had a disagreement was the minister of justice in the Juscelino Kubitschek government. He was named Armando Falcao. It was during the strike for parity. Dr Falcao wanted to arrest me in his office and violently repress the strike. I told him that that would not work out; it would not resolve anything, quite the contrary. Fortunately, Tenorio Cavalcanti, who was also present, shouted more than the minister and everything ended more or less well.

[Question] What type of participation, with what experience and outlook do you plan to return to Brazil?

[Answer] We must not under any circumstances practice or permit what we call radicalization in that Brazilian political process. Not even when it may seem motivated by very good intentions. There has always been and always will be radicalization in politics. But it was and is justified only as an act of the will and state of awareness of the masses; never of some individuals. That is what we learned before 1964 and was also the cause of the defeat of 1964. Not that we communists were the only ones responsible for that radicalization but because we were very responsible inasmuch as we participated in it and encouraged it. We had, for example, a government such as that of Joao Goulart, with its defects, its weaknesses, but always a government that strived to keep the democratic freedoms functioning in the country. At a certain point, we did not attach great importance to those characteristics. We began to consider it a government of conciliation and began to combat it. In the area of the union movement, instead of taking into account the fact that there was an intensification of the contradictions in Brazilian society, that it was important for all of that to develop in favor of the working class and the workers, and that it was important to pursue, and carry forward the democratic process--what did we do? We opted exclusively for going on strike. We refrained from solving a number of questions such as the wage question using other forms of struggle, other machinery. We opted for a form of halting production which did not always help to find a fair solution to our problems. It only gave the bourgeoisie



the pretext to unload the onus of inflation on the working class. I do not mean by that that all strikes were wrong. I say that we did not exhaust a whole line of negotiation each time before resorting to strike. Generally, our position was: first strike in order to negotiate later. That position became transformed into an element of radicalization. Another example, another element of radicalization? Our attachment to the watchword: "Agrarian reform by law or by hoe." The accumulated force did not exist for a watchword of that type, much less for the action that it would unleash.

[Question] Then the line of your return is one of prudence and caution, perhaps even of preservation of the status quo?

[Answer] We are going to pursue a position opposed to any action that does not correspond with a level of awareness and participation of the masses. Without that level of awareness and participation, our position is to seek ways, means and methods to raise the awareness of and to integrate the masses. Therefore, we are not going to be in that position of defending the status quo. We are struggling for the transformation of society, so to opt for the status quo does not make sense. The question is one of the method, the way of carrying it out. In the quest for all that, we will practice, as we are practicing, a position of prudence, of balance, of a common sense policy.

[Question] Would not the possibility of the legalization of the PCB inevitably imply the deterioration of the opposition front that until now gathered in the MDB?

[Answer] If the politicians of the organizations have good sense, I do not believe that deterioration will occur. What can happen, in fact what should occur, is a separation on the organic level. But I do not believe that all those who suffered those 15 years of repression, of difficulties, and who were engaged in the struggle to form a single front or a confederation of opposition are going to lose their heads, that they want to advance beyond an organic separation to a political division, considering the questions that are on the order of the day. Our position is to maintain an understanding with all those forces because it was only with that unity that this result--what is happening in Brazil today--was achieved. We believe that it is possible to maintain that unity even at the time of organic separation. It is possible and we are going to fight for that.

[Question] Do you believe that democracy is being talked about seriously in Brazil?

[Answer] I want to believe so, at least by those who fought against the regime. On the part of the regime, if somebody within the government is speaking honestly, he will have to prove it. He will have to prove it with deeds, and the first one would be to support a Constituent Assembly.

[Question] Do you not agree that the zeal and the identification of the Church with the social struggles, for the redemocratization of the country, may have dwindled with amnesty?

[Answer] In defense of freedoms, in defense of human rights, of democracy, I want to believe they have not. For the very reason that if the Church tries to abandon that banner, it will again have difficulties in its relationship with the Catholics, with the great mass that goes to Church. It is very difficult to believe that the Church will evolve that much. Because the position of the Brazilian Church at the Puebla conference was consistent, it confirmed its position. In Latin America, the Brazilian Church in Puebla was the one that contributed the most to the assumption of a, let us say, balanced democratic position. From its own experience during the last 15 years, the Brazilian Church is not going to abandon that struggle; it is not going to leave that field. The differences between the positions of the Church and our own are going to arise more sharply. I have no doubt that that will be so. But that is normal: democracy is like that.

[Question] In 1945 after 9 years in jail under the Vargas dictatorship, Luis Carlos Prestes surprised the country by appearing at the side of the dictator at the famous Pacaembu Stadium rally in Sao Paulo. Would a repetition of another meeting of that type, of the PCB with representatives of the military governments, be possible today?

[Answer] I do not believe in a repetition of that type because the times, the men, the political forces are different, with different histories and objectives. Getulio, who was leaving the Estado Novo [New State], veered toward nationalist positions. He demonstrated that he wanted to heed certain popular demands, including those of the workers. Even now that position of Getulio's is much discussed. The organizers of the 29 October 1945 coup said it was all demagogy made with the hope of maintaining the Estado Novo. It is possible that they are right but the concrete, objective fact is that Getulio Vargas fell, was deposed, more for that than for anything else. Another indisputable fact is that he was elected in 1950, reaffirming the position he had begun to assume in 1945. And the result is that the same forces that had deposed him unleashed a great campaign against him that led him to suicide. It is possible, one can even accept as probable, the argument that in 1945 Getulio was engaging in demagogy. Getulio was very clever, he acquired the reputation of a shrewd politician. But at that time, we could not work on the basis of the question of whether it was a matter of shrewdness or demagogy on the part of Getulio. What was operating was another fact, another element. For a number of circumstances, Getulio adopted measures which had they not been contained, had they proceeded, would have led the country toward a more intensive democratic process. At that time, there was a great visible, presence of the masses in the streets. It is not possible for those who lived through those days to forget the popular demonstrations and campaigns of 1945 and 1946. Today's government, on

the other hand, behaves in an entirely different way: for almost 2 years it appears completely occupied in absorbing democratic demands. It tries to preserve a whole repressive legislation, to safeguard the whole state apparatus established on repression. When the popular forces of the opposition began to transform Institutional Act No 5 (AI-5) into a target of a broad movement of the masses, the regime made a tactical bend, it absorbed that campaign, transferred a good part of AI-5 to the Security Law. It gave in on something but saved what for it was the most important part. The safeguards, for example, were introduced into the constitution. More recently, we had the campaign for amnesty. When it began to be transformed into a great mass campaign, the government sought to deflate it. It inserted serious discrimination in the amnesty plan. All of that makes it quite evident that the government and the regime are in a difficult situation. But at the same time, it means that they have reserves, maneuvering capability, strength. They are prepared to confront every advance of the democratic movement. And that is why the Figueiredo case has nothing to do with the Getulio case. What General Figueiredo is looking for is a formula to maintain that economic model they set up in Brazil based on the super-exploitation of the working force which justified the application of a terrible, refined repression.

[Question] At a distance, how do you judge the size and strength of the forces of opposition to the current regime?

[Answer] Like Gregorio Bezerra, I say: We are not pessimists; we are optimists. But our optimism is not gratuitous or exaggerated. It is justified, because the advance of the democratic movement in Brazil is obvious, easily verified. Brazilian society always rejected the regime at different times, in different ways. It resisted. The regime did not succeed in imposing its ideology. It tried to manufacture, to produce one, but the "Love it or leave it" did not stick.

[Question] But the march "With God, for the Family" stuck.

[Answer] But that was to carry out the coup, at the time of mobilization, of transition, when people did not quite know who was who and what was what; at the time when the process of great repression began, an increasing resistance developed. The greatest demonstration of that was given by the role of the Catholic Church, which participated in the coup but which put up a determined resistance against the process of repression, and today it occupies the position it presently holds. It is because of all that that we are optimistic and that we also see our responsibilities increased, with the duty to offer our best contribution to combat the fascist ideology that has done great harm to the spiritual development of the Brazilian people.

[Question] That resistance that you observed, can it not stimulate or give new encouragement to another attempt at armed struggle?

[Answer] There is no lack of those who fish in muddy waters and no doubt they are going to try to work in their own fashion. My impression is that the period and experiences of 1968-73 showed that that is not the road. The Brazilian process today does not permit any visualization, any attempt to resolve our problems on the level of armed struggle. That would be a figment, a mirage made up by the ultraleftist groups, who have already been defeated, or of nuclei of fascists. Those two extremes have never lost the habit or mania of "goaded the devil." That is not the position of our party; it is not the position of the Church; it is not the position of the intellectuals; nor of the PTB, which is trying to reorganize. In the case of our party, we are going to struggle and we are struggling for its legalization because we want, through open, frank debate, to contend in the elections, to plead causes in the unions, in the neighborhood associations, in short, wherever there is a battle. I mean that we want and accept the clash of political ideas within an environment of democratic coexistence so that our people can evolve politically. The experience and knowledge I have of the PCB make me certain that it will never consider the case of armed struggle, furthermore, because it is not in the interest of the working class. The workers are not interested in slaughter. I know them well to make that statement with absolute equanimity and certainty. I lived with them, worked with them and will continue to be one of them. My class does not gamble on that solution.

[Question] Have the experience of exile, social intercourse and the direct knowledge of so many formulas or practices of socialism served to define the model that you plan for Brazil?

[Answer] All of that has enriched us and I am convinced that it is going to help us formulate a more embracing policy, more suitable to the Brazilian situation. Today we are in a better position to take the experience of various countries into consideration. But only that: take into consideration. I stress that well because one of the errors we committed in the history and practice of our party was that: it was the so-called error of copying models. But fortunately today all, every one of our leaders, is aware that no copy fits us.

[Question] In the short term, what remedies does the PCB recommend for the ills of the Brazilian economy? Could an increase of state control be one of them.

[Answer] In the short term that matter of state control should not be posed. Because for the Brazilian case, that is not the best term. It would be better to speak of nationalization. In addition to defending democratic freedoms, the opposition political forces should unite around



that need to formulate an alternative to the economic model put into practice in the last 15 years. That should be another factor of unity and of another common effort. In my opinion, any alternative to the economic model must be based on a restriction of the power of the monopolies. For example, on the wage problem: practice an antimonopolist wage policy, creating a wage fund based on the super-profits of the multinational monopolies; a fund that would cover at least part of the wage expenditures of the national small and medium businesses in order to permit wage increases in all categories and, in a certain way, increasing the purchasing power, the consuming power, of the domestic market.

[Question] Would that not be a new and strange form of profit-sharing?

[Answer] No. It would simply be the creation of another fund in a Brazil that has a great tradition and a great imagination for creating funds. With it, the small and medium businessman could resort less frequently to the Central Bank, to the Bank of Brazil, for working capital. The large monopolist groups, providing another function for their large profits, would benefit from the strengthening and expansion of the domestic market (which is ever more essential to them in a world that is ever more anxious to import less). And the worker of the small or medium businesses would be in an enhanced position to maintain his wages current with the increases in the cost of living.

#### Interview With Anita Leocadia Prestes

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 4 (Special Supplement)

[Text] The sad-eyed little girl, whose life was saved thanks to an international public campaign, at 43 years of age has become a determined woman, who holds a position in the PCB leadership which for want of a better term could be called the "hard line." The story of her life is completely made up of tenacity. First, of her mother, Olga Benario (or Maria Bergner), a German of Jewish origin, a communist, who was turned over by the Getulio Vargas dictatorship to Nazi Germany, which put her in a women's prison in Berlin, where her daughter was born. Second, of her grandmother, Dona Leocadia, daughter of a good family from Porto Alegre, who moved heaven and earth to save her life and that of her mother, who ended up in a gas chamber in the Ravensbruck concentration camp.

Anita Leocadia lived her first 9 years in exile in Mexico. She did not get to see her father, Captain Luis Carlos Prestes, then in prison during the Estado Novo dictatorship, until after the 1945 amnesty. Between 12 and 18 years of age, she was again exiled, this time in Moscow. In 1964 she completed a course in industrial chemistry in the Praia Vermelha School in Rio

de Janeiro but could not get a job at the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petrobras). For 13 years she has again been living in exile in Moscow with her father, with whom she plans to return to Brazil as soon as the amnesty is proclaimed.

[Question] This return of yours to Brazil has a personal aspect. Do you return as a communist, as a leader of the Brazilian Communist Party?

[Answer] First, I want to voice my surprise over the fact that the JORNAL DO BRASIL requested this interview with me. In the second place, I would like to make it clear that I am returning to Brazil as a communist, which I have always been and continue to be, but not as a leader of the PCB. I was in the party leadership for some time but I left that leadership. I myself presented my resignation. I left because I had a number of disagreements I hope I will have the opportunity to explain on the occasion of the seventh congress, the convocation of which is already public knowledge. On that occasion like all communist, I will certainly have the right to express my opinions.

[Question] What does humility mean; what may be understood by humility, by modesty, in that case?

[Answer] It is, I would like to say, perhaps not so much humility, but really modesty. I plan to return to Brazil, make contact with our people, work, participate in the life of our people, become acquainted with today's Brazilian situation at first hand, listening to people, learning with them. The truth is that that double exile--which means both the exile outside of Brazil and the clandestine status, which is an exile within Brazil--into which I was forced during a certain period of my life owing to repression leads us to a detachment from the real situation, from the struggles of the people, from their daily life; thus, the importance of really returning with great modesty, making contact with what people think, with the changes that have occurred in Brazil during these recent years.

[Question] Do you have an idea of those changes, how they came about, of the magnitude of those changes?

[Answer] Of course, I have my opinions. I keep abreast of the Brazilian situation with great interest, its development, the struggles of our people, of the democratic forces; but I believe that to follow it from the outside is not the same thing as being involved in those struggles. For that reason I consider the return and reintegration in Brazilian society of the greatest importance. I feel myself to be a Brazilian, a patriot, a democrat, a communist, who must participate in the life of her people, the life of the Brazilian people.

[Question] What do you identify as fundamental in that process of transformation of Brazil for your return, for the return of your Party? What has changed the most?

[Answer] It is my opinion that as a result of the 1964 coup, a military dictatorship established itself in Brazil which through a number of new mechanisms, through an authoritarian and repressive state contributed decisively to a speeded-up capitalist development of the country. Especially the "wage squeeze" policy and the unprecedented "opening" to foreign capital--for which ever-increasing repression was indispensable--enabled Brazil to undergo a profound transformation of its socio-economic structure, of all economic, social, political and cultural life in general. In my view after some years of the military regime--which in a more or less long and complex process became transformed into what we call a fascist military dictatorship--there was established in our country what various Marxist authors term state monopoly capitalism. Under the conditions existing in Brazil, in my view, there occurred a process of interpenetration of the state with the national and foreign monopolies, giving rise to a single mechanism for capital accumulation. Of course, these problems need to be studied more and in greater depth. What I want to point out now is that since those transformations that took place in the post-1964 Brazil are so profound, they demand not only new analyses but also new responses by the democratic and leftist forces. Those transformations, that great capitalist development that has occurred, have radically changed the whole Brazilian society. And here also I want to point out only one aspect that seems to me to be of the greatest importance: the emergence of many new sectors of the working class, concentrated in the so-called "key" industries, that have been assuming a notable leadership role in union struggles, as shown by this year's strikes in the Sao Paulo ABC. I believe that all those changes present new challenges for the forces of the left in general and for the communists in particular.

[Question] Do you believe that for that group of leaders, the exile contributed to the formulation or reformulation of a Brazilian socialist road?

[Answer] That is a question that seems to me to be difficult to answer. I believe that the influences of the exile were different for each individual, depending greatly on the attitude of each. I consider that there is always much to be learned from all peoples, from the experience of others, but that is no substitute for the in-depth knowledge of our specific Brazilian situation. With regard to me, personally, in exile I tried to learn as much as possible. As for the problem of the road to socialism in Brazil, I am convinced that it cannot be copied from any model; it will have to be something original, formulated on the basis of the situation existing in our country, applying and developing the theory of scientific socialism under Brazilian conditions.

[Question] Many ascribe greater responsibility to the Brazilian Communist Party or the Brazilian communists for what happened in Brazil after 1964. Do you share that idea?

[Answer] It is publicly well known that the PCB has already carried out more than one selfcriticism during its history, including one about the events of 1964. In my view, that selfcritical process must be pursued, it must be gone into in depth. And certainly the seventh congress will be a good occasion for that.

[Question] Would you recommend a revolutionary return for the party, or a more moderate, more patient return?

[Answer] I believe that the alternative posed in the question is false. The question is not set in those terms, in my opinion. As I pointed out a little while ago, Brazilian society has changed greatly; there are new situations, there are very complex problems demanding solution. I hope the seventh congress will be held in an internal democratic climate that will permit wide discussion of those problems and the formulation of a correct policy in order that we can advance on the road to socialism in our country.

[Question] To many people who kept abreast, or thought they were keeping abreast of the activities of the communist leadership and members abroad, you were identified as a "hard-liner." Do you believe that that identification, that label is justified?

[Answer] Generally, I am opposed to any kind of label. That is not the best course for discussion of any problem, within or outside the party. It only leads to getting people stirred up and does not contribute to clarifying the real problems that are of interest to everyone. In addition, I do not believe I should be the one to pass judgment on myself; I am certainly not the best person to do so. My comrades, my friends will do so more correctly.

[Question] How did you arrive at an acceptance, a conscious identification with Marxist philosophy and with the Brazilian Communist Party?

[Answer] In my case, it is obvious that since my infancy I was subject to the influence of my family, a family of communists. My father was already a communist then and was in jail because of his ideas; my mother would be murdered in a concentration camp in Nazi Germany. The education I received at home from the time I was little was to be on the side of the oppressed, of the exploited and the wronged. In my conception as a child, the question was posed in that way. I was raised by my grandmother and one of my aunts who taught me the idea that I should be proud of my parents, who were persecuted because they were fighting for a better, less unjust



world. All of that created in me a very great predisposition to later accept the ideas of scientific socialism and the communist ideals. That obviously came at a later, adult phase, when I could then in a rational manner make an ideological choice. The knowledge I had of the life of our people contributed greatly to my opting for socialism. Something that always moved me, touched me very deeply was the poverty, the very distressing life, the terrible conditions under which the majority of our people live; the Brazilian children, the problem of abandoned children, I mean, the tragedy of those who live in poverty.

[Question] Does your father continue to exercise great influence on you or is it you who has greater influence over him?

[Answer] It is obvious that as a person becomes an adult, the relationships between parents and children become different. I have very great admiration for my father, that is natural, and I believe that he deserves that admiration. That does not mean that I do not also have a critical spirit regarding him, that I do not discuss with him. I believe that the relationship that exists between us, including in the political area, is the normal relationship between two adult persons, who are in agreement about many things but also have differences and discuss them fraternally.

[Question] Could you draw a political sketch and a human sketch of your father?

[Answer] That is a somewhat difficult task. To say it simply, what I most admire in him is his dedication to the revolutionary cause which he embraced while still young. He is a man who, now 81 years old, has dedicated his whole life, completely, to the cause of socialism and never weighed the sacrifices in doing so. He is also a man whose integrity is unquestioned, even by his enemies. General Cordeiro de Farias, who, as is known, is in the opposition camp, said that Prestes can only be judged by history. That does not mean that I consider that he, like any other person, like any other human being, does not have defects. Furthermore, he is the first to admit them. I believe, however, that it is not my place to judge his defects.

[Question] Did the exile and the clandestine status, which were lengthy in your case, make of you a more sectarian person, a more sectarian politician or, on the contrary, did they mellow you?

[Answer] As I have already said, it is very difficult for a person to have an opinion about himself. In my specific case, I believe that, like everybody else, with the passing of the years I am today a more mature person than I was, for example, 10 years ago.

[Question] Ten years ago you were more radical?

[Answer] As I have just said, I do not think the question is set in terms of greater or lesser radicalism but rather of maturing.

[Question] What type of democracy do you dream of today for Brazil?

[Answer] As a communist, I struggle so that some day in Brazil we will arrive at socialism and, therefore, the most advanced form of democracy: socialist democracy. I am firmly convinced that only in socialism will it be possible to resolve the great problems of the people and nation: poverty and hunger, illiteracy and disease, public health and work for all, national independence and democracy for all the people, not only for some elites. That is, I believe that only socialist democracy will be able to insure the exercise of all democratic rights for the broad masses of our people. The truth is that, to this day even in the most democratic periods of our history, the great popular masses have had a meager participation in the political life of the nation, in the solution of national problems. And today it is those same masses, particularly the working class, that are beginning to demand the right of actual and real political participation. Obviously, all of that does not mean that I am setting the socialist revolution as an immediate objective. The great problem lies precisely in finding the road to socialism under Brazilian conditions, in knowing how to find the ways and means to link today's struggles for freedoms and the rights of workers with socialist strategic objectives. And that is really not a simple question. I do not have a miraculous solution; besides, this is a problem that is being widely discussed today by communists all over the world. In my opinion, it is clear that it is on the basis of the present struggles for the defeat of the dictatorship and for the achievement of democratic freedoms that it will be possible to go about uniting, organizing and raising the awareness of the masses for the achievement of ever more advanced forms of democracy and, ultimately, of socialist democracy.

[Question] You are not concerned about the fact that those strikes are occurring too frequently and too unrelentingly?

[Answer] From what I have learned, following events through the Brazilian press, the current strikes were not "provoked" by forces outside the workers and union movement. They are spontaneous struggles which stem from the situation in which the wage-earning masses find themselves in our country, a situation of poverty, hunger, of an alarming decline of their purchasing power. They are, therefore, just struggles. Obviously, errors may have been committed and it is possible that there are people who want to take advantage of those movements for acts of provocation. In the meantime, it seems to me that the most important thing to point out is that after 15 years of dictatorship, the working class has not lost its combativeness nor its willingness to struggle for its rights.

[Question] Nor its organization?

[Answer] I would hesitate to say that because the impression I have is that that organization is quite embryonic; it is still in an initial phase, only beginning.

[Question] There are those who say that today, because of his age, Luis Carlos Prestes should no longer lead, be the number one man in that leadership of the Communist Party. Do you share that idea, that opinion?

[Answer] I believe that that is a question to be decided by the party congress.

[Question] What is the most important result you hope to gain from that congress?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is very important to create conditions--including the legalization of the PCB--so that the congress may be the most democratic possible, so that a broad participation of all members of the party is assured, and I would say, not only of the members of the party but of all who are interested in the PCB and in the socialist prospect of our country.

[Question] What preferred allies do you identify today among the political forces that are operating in Brazil?

[Answer] The immediate task posed today for all democratic and opposition forces is to defeat the dictatorship and achieve democracy in Brazil. That is why I consider that all those forces and personalities who in one way or another are against the dictatorship are our allies: the Church, the MDB, organizations such as the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), and the Brazilian Press Association (ABI), movements such as the committees for amnesty, the cost of living movement, etc.

[Question] Do you exclude the possibility of a reversal of that process?

[Answer] Obviously, the possibility of a reversal of the so-called process of "democratic opening." Especially, if we take into account the fact that the apparatus of repression remains; it has not been dismantled. And also the national security law, that is based on the so-called "doctrine of national security," which we can consider the ideological support of fascism in Brazil. However, the development of events this last year seems to indicate that the principal tendency is toward the strengthening of the democratic forces, the advance of democratic gains, despite the still weak--in my opinion--level of organization and unity of opposition forces.

[Question] Could the industrialization that has taken place in Brazil during the last 15 years indirectly contribute to facilitating the operation of the Communist Party?

[Answer] I do not agree with that way of posing the question. Speaking in terms of historic perspective, without doubt the world, is advancing toward socialism. However, that advance takes place through a long and complex process, through many zig-zags. In 1964 the democratic forces were defeated in Brazil as a result of the coup d'etat. We suffered a serious defeat and these 15 years of dictatorship were 15 years of oppression, of immense difficulties to carry the ideas—I will not say, of socialism--the democratic and progressive ideas--to our people. All of that represented a great barrier to the popular forces in our country. The revolt of the masses grew very much but we know that revolt alone does not lead to socialism. A lengthy task of organization and of raising awareness is necessary, and the existence of freedoms is a condition of the greatest importance for that purpose.

It is obvious that with capitalist development the number and size of factories increases, the working class grows, and becomes more concentrated. But political awareness is not acquired spontaneously; it results from a whole task of organization and education of the masses, of a whole experience of struggle.

[Question] But is there a more politicized working class in Brazil today?

[Answer] I consider that quite debatable for the same reasons I cited above. Without doubt, new sectors of the working class have emerged that, precisely because they are connected with "key" sectors of the economy, have a higher level of education, have more knowledge and broader horizons. That is an objective fact. Now, the problem of political class awareness, as I already said, I believe can only be acquired through a whole political task by the most enlightened forces. I mean, it is not something that reaches the working class automatically.

[Question] What is the weight given to nationalism in the new party line?

[Answer] In my personal opinion, if we accept the proposition about which I spoke earlier, regarding the creation of monopoly state capitalism in Brazil, in which the state becomes part of the mechanism for the reproduction of monopoly capital and is subordinated to those monopoly interests, in this case primarily foreign monopolies, we will also have to accept the fact that foreign capital that is, imperialism, is the principal enemy to defeat. The analysis of today's Brazilian economy clearly reveals that its key points belong to foreign monopolies. That is why in the today's Brazil, it is necessary to fight against imperialism. The great question, in my opinion, is how to make a correct connection between the struggle for democracy and the struggle against the monopolies and for socialism.



[Question] Would state-control be an instrument in that struggle?

[Answer] In today's Brazil, the power of the state is very great, much greater than in 1964. The question I would pose is: In whose service is this state? And there, it seems to me that it is correct to say, as many observers are already saying, that the Brazilian state is basically in the service of the national and foreign monopolies, but especially the latter. In my opinion, therefore, for the democratic and progressive forces, it is a matter of putting this same state in the service of the great working masses, of all those who today are despoiled by the monopolies.

[Question] Would not agrarian reform be a valid banner?

[Answer] I think so. And this is a banner that is being raised by all the progressive forces in Brazil. It seems to me that the great problem we have to define better is what type of agrarian reform? What specific measures? In my opinion, we need to define clearly not only agrarian reform but the solutions we propose for the various Brazilian problems.

[Question] Has that problem not yet been adequately studied?

[Answer] I believe that it is still very inadequate. Many people have been studying the agrarian problem in Brazil but the truth is that the left in Brazil, and particularly the communists, in my opinion, do not yet have a very concrete agrarian reform alternative. It seems to me also that agrarian reform is not unconnected with the solution of other Brazilian problems. It is impossible to carry out an agrarian reform that really resolves the problems of the great rural masses in Brazil without at the same time confronting other questions such as that of monopoly control, the role of the state, etc. Those are related problems, in my opinion. They cannot be resolved separately.

[Question] Could those goals be attained by peaceful means?

[Answer] I would not venture to say that. I believe that, obviously, if it possible to avert armed struggle, that will be the best course. But I also believe that conditions do not yet exist in the Brazilian situation to discount that type of struggle in advance. I believe that that question does not present itself at the moment and for that reason cannot be answered.

#### The Dilemma of Democratization

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRAZIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 3 (Special Supplement)

[Article by Wilson Figueiredo: "The PCB: a Dilemma of the Political Opening")

[Text] The political opening, in the phase of conjecture, is already considering the parties that deserve to enter, and presents an opportunity to reexamine an old viewpoint: "Is it better to deal with the communist in the open? The legalization of the PCB would be equivalent to a census. However, there is another corresponding view seen from the opposite angle: mistrust. Who will guarantee that the communists will not maintain an auxiliary line hidden from the eyes of the law?

The question of legalization of the PCB, however, is not limited to tactical advisability and a naive suspicion. So much so that the problem is involving the political opening and entering the area of debate, despite being a demand by the communists on the recognized political citizenry. The fact is that the PCB has existed for almost 60 years despite not being generally recognized.

The Brazilian Communist Party has had a party structure, program, executive committees, leaders and follows since 25 March 1922. But in its 57 years, it has been recognized as a political party with legal existence only a little more than 2 years. World War II had not yet been militarily wound up and the year 1945 was beginning when Brazil began to anticipate its political fruits: the Estado Novo collapsed in February and political recruiting began to be conducted openly. Liberals and communists, with some variants, went out together to occupy the political vacuum left by a dictatorship already without external patronage or internal support.

The communists were politically recognized as the result of an international situation of euphoria which did not discriminate against them, but also by reason of a domestic political credit. They had been a political force pursued with some preference by the dictatorship. They had participated in the mobilization of a national conscience for the military participation of Brazil in the war and, in their way, worked to shake the credibility of the dictatorship. In some areas of struggle, but especially among students and among intellectuals, liberals and communists, they were allies in the immediate objectives, although differing as to tactics, between 1942 and 1945.

Together they carried out the campaign for a (broad, general and unrestricted) amnesty, which Getulio Vargas granted immediately in the beginning of April to prevent it from being used to wrest greater demands from him. In the vacuum--the parties had been dissolved in 1937 and the congress simply closed--the recruiting began to obey the natural laws of the political market.

After a dictatorship devoid of a sense of the future, it was inevitable that events would proceed in the broadest sense. There were also those at the time who defended as a visual question the advisability of having the communists under the eyes of society, and similarly those who did not abandon the suspicion that communist parties are icebergs that only reveal the tip. But everything was secondary before the avalanche of events. The dictatorship was collapsing without support inside or outside the country.

Two years later, the PCB had its political registration canceled by the Electoral Court and returned underground. The assessment of the political errors committed by the Brazilian communists in their brief legal existence was never able to be made because the circumstance of the new clandestine situation dispensed them of the need to do so. And at the same time, nobody at that time wanted to enter into the matter of the internal affairs of a party that intolerance had isolated from political intercourse.

As a result, the errors of assessment would lead the PCB to the folly of lack of realism represented by the August Manifesto; it entered the fifites with an appeal for armed struggle despite the well-known lack of arms and of people disposed to take them up.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the question of the legalization of the PCB, even in the form of doubt, is in the minds of all those who are accustomed to thinking politically. There is no doubt, however, that the occasion makes it advisable to examine such a controversial matter. Because in its development, the party reform will have to consider that some solution be found for the Brazilian communists.

The president of the republic drew a prior line of demarcation on the subject with the definition that it is a matter of law not of government. Article 152 of the constitution says that the organization and operation of political parties must observe the established principles. And among them, the only requirement that applies to the PCB is in Section III, which stipulates... "and without links of any kind to the action of foreign governments, organizations or parties."

And, incidentally, that was precisely the trap into which the PCB let itself be caught "in full flight" when the Electoral Court deprived it of legal recognition as a result of a statement by its secretary general himself. Although taking exception to the provocative nature of the question, the then Senator Luis Carlos Prestes fell into the provocation and got tangled up in dialectical subtlety in his reply. He ended up by saying that in case of a war between Brazil and the Soviet Union, the Brazilian communists would take up arms against the war, that is, against the Brazilian Government.

Requirements of that type for the legal existence of any party tend to survive. There is no constitutional reform that can dispense with them. It is the Communist Party that would have to change if it really wants legal status. However, a formal, merely legal solution would not suffice to diminish the various prejudices that have accrued over the years with regard to the communists. There is no point in Byzantine discussions about the nature and degree of those relations between communist parties and even governments of communist governments. There are questions for which the left has not found answers capable of satisfying a democratic sentiment which, as it ceases to be merely formal, also obliges the communists to change habits and concepts.

The need to find new political patterns led the communists in Italy and Spain to be pioneers in the application of the concept of Eurocommunism. But even so, despite the legal status which the communist parties enjoy in Western Europe, they have not succeeded in sweeping away an identical mistrust in society. In its launching stage, Eurocommunism has not yet scored an election victory nor dispelled the suspicion that it is a matter of fireworks promoted for tactical reasons.

The PCB has a heritage of accumulated political errors. The clandestine status is the protective shell of communist leaders who have never had to give an accounting of their ideological deviations and political mistakes. The underground life has also exempted the PCB from election responsibilities of its own.

The question, therefore, does not pertain merely to the communists. It exists despite the errors accumulated by the PCB. The communists have a confirmed capability for election activity, always called to an active role in the campaigns. But that is all. It was that way until 1964 and it did not change later. They abstained in the presidential succession of 1950 because they were not only outside the law but out of touch with the situation. But in 1954, they entered into the final phase of the campaign of Juscelino Kubitschek, and in 1960 participated extensively on behalf of the candidacy of General Teixeira Lott.

In the state elections also, the pragmatically switched between the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the UDN or the PTB. In exchange for active participation in the campaigns, they negotiated for merely the inclusion of a few names which, not being labeled, would secure election registration on the slates of the other parties. And they unloaded the party vote on them. Nothing more.

However, the PCB did not withstand the force of the contrast between the political activity demonstrated in the legal phase and the incipient, subordinate presence after it returned underground. The appearance between the two situations served to strengthen the fallacy that the PCB is the political beneficiary of a legal status. The real capability of operation of the communists reappeared clearly in the social and political agitation that led to 1964.

Few remember also that between 1945 and 1947, the Communist Party did not register an increase in its vote. In its debut, the PCB elected 14 deputies and one senator to the Constituent Assembly. And in the supplementary elections, it strengthened itself with two more deputies, already under the Social Progressive Party (PSP) label. Its greatest election feat was the vote for its own candidate in the first presidential elections. In round numbers, the communists got close to 10 percent out of an electorate of 6 million votes with which we entered the redemocratization of 1945.



That percentage would become a universal constant; so many years later, the communists continue to range between 10 and 12 percent--with a slight variation upward as well as downward--in any country. The exceptions are, also since that time, France and Italy. But even so they have not achieved power via the election route, neither in these nor in any other country. The latest examples were Portugal after 25 April and, in the opposite situation, Spain. Nothing over 13 percent.

The conviction that coexistence with the communists is a risk that democratic regimes cannot forego is part of a current concept of the representative vision; that their exclusion from legal responsibilities affords the opportunity for the restrictions to end up affecting other political elements; and also that it does not offer the guarantee that they can actually be isolated in a society open to debate.

The most current concept of the democratic risk represented by the communists stems from the fact that they have never achieved power via elections. And that in order to increase their prospects they would have to change their behavior and political methods as a result of which they would lose their personality. Despite everything they say, they have not yet managed to approach the standard of democratic tolerance.

The sum of the PCB's political errors is a matter that does not pertain to the political opening. Nevertheless, it remains as a barrier between the communists and those who could defend the legal participation of the PCB in the political process. The communists, however, are more to blame than they confess, since the coupist adventure of 1935. They handed on a silver platter the pretext for the liquidation of the constitutional regime and the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937.

In 1945, out of inevitable opportunism, they hastened to break an alliance with the urban middle class. The amnesty campaign slackened the relations between the communists and the liberal sentiment (that had taken root in the UDN) in the struggle against the Estado Novo. In the meantime, still in jail, Luis Carlos Prestes held out his hand to the dictator and, after leaving, made the political choice: he believed that a weakened Getulio Vargas could be a better ally than the UDN liberals. And finally, he put the candidacies of Eurico Dutra and Eduardo Gomes on the same level, as equally reactionary, and then put forward the PCB's own candidate. The UDN side blamed Prestes for the loss of the opportunity to win those elections.

But the effect of the ideological and political slight on the middle class was irreparable. Immediately afterwards, there came the loss of registration, and as a consequence, the termination of mandates. The useless resistance without much social support confirmed its political frailty.

Then came the August Manifesto and its disappearance from the scene. The sequence of errors was followed by the greatest error: the pretension to carry out an armed struggle alone. And in the 1954 crisis, Vargas' death showed the PCB in absolute political default.

The PCB has systematically avoided facing up to its ideological and political errors. Today it admits--and Prestes has already declared it--the great error of 1964. But it is an act without depth. It does not get to the root of the errors and as a result fails to produce any effect on the nature of that assessment. In fact, it is a successive error. That contribution is not sufficient to indicate a new, real disposition to correct profound deviations and show a capacity for coexistence with diverse political forces. In short, the communists have not regained the democratic confidence, even of those who, though having nothing to do with their political aims, would admit them as partners in the common representative life.

Despite everything, the problems of Brazilian democracy in the stage of party redefinition will have to consider objectively what to do about the PCB. And not only because the communist are going to present themselves in the position of demanding legal status. Not even because the legal existence of the PCB has the virtue of characterizing a regime as being democratic. But above all, because their absence from the political process likewise is not a characteristic of democracy, nor does it represent a guarantee that it can be stable and enduring.

#### 'Before and After Prestes'

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 5 (Special Supplement)

[Article by Fernando Pedreira]

[Text] Perhaps the best known and most famous of the Polish communist leaders was Gomulka. He ruled Poland for some years, was deposed, returned to power until finally, after another workers rebellion, he fell once more and never rose again.

Poor Gomulka. It is said that in the mid-fifties, three prisoners found themselves in the same cell in a famous political prison in Warsaw. The first prisoner asked the second one why he had been arrested. "Because I organized a demonstration of support for Gomulka," replied the prisoner with pride. The other was surprised: "Well, I was arrested because I participated in a demonstration against him." At this point, confused, the two turned to the third prisoner: "And you, comrade, why were you arrested?" "I am Gomulka," he replied, mournfully.

A similar anecdote would probably be impossible in Brazil, even if it had been invaded by the Soviet Army and our Communist Party raised to power, as was the Polish party. For 50 years, the Brazilian Communist Party has had the same leader, Luis Carlos Prestes. Prestes joined the party when he lived in Argentina, having taken refuge after the conclusion of the glorious adventure of the "Undeclared Column." Since those distant days, the history of communism among us blends with his own. If someone some day succeeds in writing a good biography of Prestes, he will have written the true history of the Brazilian Communist Party, at least in that half century that separates us from the victory of the lieutenants and the Revolution of 1930.

Throughout that period, the communist influence over the Brazilian political picture is the influence of Prestes or the result of the decisions and actions he took or failed to take. What could be left out? Perhaps the recent Cuban-inspired guerrilla activity of Marighela and Lamarca. But Marighela himself was a veteran and ardent follower of Prestes, molded in the days of the ANL [National Liberation Alliance] and of the uprising of November 1935 commanded by Prestes.

A strange figure, that Captain Prestes, an officer with a strict positivist background, considered to be the most capable and brilliant of his generation, marked by such an extraordinary vocation for leadership. Very few Brazilian public figures have enjoyed the respect and even the admiration of adversaries and critics that he has. Had it not been for the prestige and authority of Prestes, communism in Brazil would not have become even a shadow of what it was, especially for the generations of 1922-30-35 and of 1945-50; that is, for the Brazilians who are today between 82 years of age (Prestes' age) and our 50. ,

In fact, so considerable were the presence and participation of Prestes (as a man and as a legend) in the contemporary history of the country, that the subject perhaps should now be seriously reexamined by intelligent (and independent) persons such as Buarque de Hollanda or Celso Furtado. Perhaps along this trail we might make some discoveries about the meanderings of our national soul, for the truth is that Prestes has been a commander of successive defeats and failures. His long career does not include a single victory and, on the contrary is an accumulation of frequently dismal disasters with dire consequences not only for the Communist Party but for the left in general, and for the country itself.

The fact that, despite everything, he has exercised such an enduring and intense fascination over the Brazilians is what deserves more thoughtful analysis. To say that, enlightened by the teaching of the Argentine Roldolpho Ghioldi, Prestes became a communist in 1930 is not much because the truth is that he was always a communist of a very definite kind: an orthodox, an aparatchik, a soldier faithful to the Soviet top bureaucracy and its

policy that even now in his most recent interviews he defends in all its line without blinking, even in the face of episodes such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia or the crushing of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. What can be said is that Prestes obeys the Soviets with such steadfastness and such conviction that his obedience takes an apostolic air; it becomes respectable and exemplary.

Perhaps it is that same quality that so frequently gives his defeats the character of victory. It is not amiss here to make a brief review of the most notable episodes since the Column that launched him as a leader and would end up forced to withdraw to Bolivia and to put down its arms, but would leave behind it an indelible legend of heroism and bravery.

First: The disastrous military uprising of November 1935, which would lead to the liquidation of the ANL and the country's leftist organizations, would open the way for the establishment of the Estado Novo and would leave an indelible anticommunist mark on the officers of our armed forces.

Second: The alliance with Getulio at the end of the war (and of incarceration) in 1945. That alliance divided the opposition to the dictatorship, undermined it among the people, and ended up insuring the continuation in power of the men of the Estado Novo. Two years later, the whole country (including the lawyers of the Communist Party) knew that the Dutra government had decided to close the Communist Party. Except for Prestes, who did not believe it and ended up being caught by surprise by the closing.

Third: The final months of the Goulart government from 1963 to 1964, the sergeants' revolt in Brasilia, the incessant strikes, the Central rally, the sailors' mutiny. About that period, the best criticism is that of Prestes himself, speaking last December on TV-Bandeirantes. "The Communist Party erred," he said, "because it had enough influence over President Goulart to contain the excesses committed and it did not use it." Prestes, therefore, admits that Jango was really under communist influence and that the defeat stemmed from errors and excesses that should have been avoided. However, in 1964 he was still so deluded about the situation that the revolution took him by surprise and forced him to leave his home in haste, leaving in it his famous "notebooks" that incriminated scores of people, many times unfairly.

Perhaps we can derive some paradoxical conclusions from these few episodes. It was stated that Prestes was always a faithful and disciplined soldier of the Soviet bureaucracy. It will not be denied, however, that his enormous presence and his undisputed leadership has made communism in Brazil not only greater but more "Brazilian," less European. In effect, since 1935, Prestes has accentuated and consolidated the military, petit-bourgeois, coupist, "caudilloist" nature of our Communist Party and of our left.



Brazil has never had a sufficiently and well-organized workers and union movement that could serve as the base for its leftist parties. If it had not been for Prestes, it is likely that men such as Astrogildo Pereira would have spent their lives trying (perhaps without too much success) to organize the workers and plant the seed of Marxist doctrine among them. With Prestes, the Communist Party suddenly gained such an audience, such great repercussion among the most influential sectors of Brazilian society that that humble effort seemed insignificant and ended up being rejected. The workers remained under the aegis of Getulio's paternalistic populism of which the left would end up becoming an ally and accomplice.

Prestes now announces his forthcoming return to Brazil. After 50 years, it cannot be doubted that his era has come to an end. Brazilian communism will never again have a charismatic leader of his stature, and therefore, it will never regain the weight and influence it achieved in 1935 or in 1945. The Prestes era will be succeeded (is being succeeded) by a contradictory, protestant, polycentric communism made up of small rival and aggressively militant sects born out of the great explosion of 1968.

By their own style, by their characteristic anxiety and impatience, these sects have little in common with the workers' and unions' manner of being. As a matter of fact, they are all still more petit-bourgeois and coupist than Prestes himself. The more calm and prudent our working class appears, the more unadapted they will become. To that must be added the recent collapse of Marxist-Leninist prestige among the European intellectuals (who have so much influence here), in view of the invasion of Prague, the revelations of Solzhenitsyn and the recent events in Southeast Asia, where the ultimate defeat of the Americans appears to have worsened things further rather than improving them...

Therefore, whether or not the Communist Party attains legal status, everything indicates that now we will not have strong leftist parties, whether socialist or communist and, much less, with a good workers' base. As before, our left seeks to act and influence by infiltrating among the populists or allying itself with them, which is certainly still better than the tactic of isolated and violent actions to which small radical groups so frequently resort.

Review of the opera: Bad with Prestes, worse without him. God is Brazilian but contrary to what was once believed in certain circles, perhaps he is not Marxist.

#### 'Generation of Party Activists Lost'

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 6 (Special Supplement)

[Text] A look at the list of leaders who disappeared between 1974 and 1975 suffices to give an idea of the impact made by the security organs on the organization of the PCB. If we also consider the losses suffered

as a result of dissidence in the sixties--Pedro Pomar, Joao Amazonas, Mauricio Grabois, Apolonio de Carvalho, Mario Alves and Carlos Marighela--the disappearance of party activists such as David Capistrano, Orlando Bonfim, Joao Massena and Luiz Inacio Maranhao resulted in the end of almost a whole generation molded during the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas.

After a semilegal phase during the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek and Joao Goulart, the communists were again placed in the category of major enemy after 1964. Even so, the persecution unleashed did not succeed in producing results compatible with the proclaimed risk of the seizure of power by the communists. The most important arrest of the period was that of Gregorio Bezerra, captured by an army patrol and taken to Recife, where he was tortured and displayed on the streets.

The supreme leader of the PCB, Luiz Carlos Prestes, remained hidden in the country until 1971, when he traveled to the Soviet Union. Before that, however, the names of various other leaders became known and were presented in absentia in court proceedings opened by the Military Court, beginning in 1966.

Without abandoning the line of "peaceful road to socialism" which would cost it serious dissidence, the PCB negotiated its participation in the Broad Front proposed by Carlos Lacerda in 1967 with the aim of uniting the opposition to the 1964 regime. Until the Medici government, the violent methods of repression were aimed mainly at the leftist armed organizations whose tactics of holdups and kidnappings were condemned by the communists under the leadership of Prestes.

The year 1972 marked the beginning of a process of getting tougher with the PCB, which coincided with the annihilation of the armed left. In August, the security organs released the report on the dismantling of a grassroots PCB organization in Sao Paulo, headed by Prestes' daughter, Anita Leocadia. Almost simultaneously, the members of the PCB foreign relations committee were arrested in Rio. One of them, Celso Augusto Guedes, according to the version of the Naval Intelligence Center (Cenimar), killed himself in prison.

In an interview with the JORNAL DO BRASIL (published on 3 December 1972) under the code names Carlos and Alcindo, the former member of the PCB, Adauto Alves dos Santos, revealed that the foreign relations section was created after the sixth party congress, for the purpose of maintaining contact with the diplomatic representations of the socialist countries, to which it would send information about Brazil, receiving money and propaganda material in exchange. Adauto also revealed the presence in the country of former Deputy Marco Antonio Coelho, member of the Central Committee, who was maintaining regular contacts with Prestes abroad.

In the beginning of 1975, the security authorities announced the arrest of Marco Antonio in Sao Paulo. Months earlier, in an interview given in Paris, Luis Carlos Prestes had revealed that the PCB had supported part of the credit for the defeat imposed on the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA).

Also in 1975, in February, a new victory was announced by the security organs with the discovery in Rio and Sao Paulo of the underground printing presses that the PCB used to print the VOZ OPERARIA, organ of the party Central Committee, and propaganda material.

The same year, statements from military sectors reached congress, warning that the formation of a congressional investigation committee, with which the MDB sought to investigate the disappearance of individuals for political reasons, would not be tolerated. A short time later, military police inquiries were opened in the areas of the first, second, third and fourth armies with the aim of investigating the attempts to reorganize the PCB.

#### VOZ OPERARIA's International Connection

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 7 (Special Supplement)

[Text] The editorial office of VOZ OPERARIA, the PCB organ, is mobile; it is always ready for a quick change of address. Today it is operating in a small residential apartment in a "banlieue," one of those Parisian suburbs administered by a communist perfect. Its printing plant has an even more indefinite address: "Somewhere in Italy," managed and operated by Italian comrades.

The large editions of VO, as the Brazilian communists call their central organ, do not exceed 4,000 copies, (normally) printed on eight pages of very fine rice paper, which simplifies and reduces the cost of forwarding it to Brazil, to almost all states where the PCB remains organized and operating underground.

Whoever receives it in Brazil is supposed to begin a multiplication operation without delay: reproducing it and disseminating it as well as he can, as widely as possible, putting into operation the "capillary distribution" of the mini-tabloid, seeking to reach not only the members and sympathizers but all centers of decision and political information.

Working always with meager funds, sometimes without sufficient funds to pay all the expenses involved in forwarding it by air, the VO cannot consider either increasing its periodicity or the number of copies. It must resign itself to a monthly circulation; it cannot exceed 3 or 4,000 copies. It must frequently reexamine the usefulness and currency of the file of addresses it uses for its circulation.

Next month's issue will be No 39 of VO in exile. The first in that series bears the date of April 1976; it picked up the number interrupted by the fall of the two printing presses of the newspaper in Brazil (it resumed with No 123) and maintained a symbolic price of 1 cruzeiro, which today no longer appears below its masthead.

It was an issue full of orthographic errors; the characteristic accents of the Portuguese language were distributed according to the likings of the foreign printers. The miracle was to find a well-placed tilde or cedilla, performing its phonetic function. The Central Committee report on the need to "guarantee the elections and increase the resistance to the dictatorship" suffered comic distortions. It even changed the "weak [fracos] points" of the Geisel government to "forthright [francos] points."

But in two columns, the front-page editorial on "The Return of VOZ OPERARIA" concludes with this emphatic statement: "This newspaper ceased circulating for almost 1 year but the communists did not cease their struggle. In the factories and in the unions, in the schools, in the representative political, professional and social institutions of our people, wherever their action could contribute to enlightening, uniting, helping those who want a better, democratic and free Brazil--the communists were always there. And they will remain there with the resolute support of our people and the now renewed cooperation of their VOZ OPERARIA."

#### Some Mysteries

The decision to publish it abroad was not taken immediately after the invasion of their printing facilities (in December 1974) in Rio and Sao Paulo where it was printed, but some months later. After the loss of the printing presses, the PCB managed with enormous difficulty and risk to put out two very crude and quite skimpy issues. The last edition of the VO in Brazil was that of March 1975. The cessation of its publication coincided with the cessation of the operation of the Central Committee in the country.

Where? In what country did the VO appear abroad? To this day, the PCB leaders make a mystery about that information. Almost surely, it was not in Italy. Certainly, in Western Europe. Another piece of information about which the party remains reserved is the cost of operating the VO. They say that it is not high but that they have never made an exact survey.

A great problem that publication abroad has created for the paper was the one imposed by foregoing the currency of its information. The VO is perhaps one of the few papers in the world that begins to be distributed 20 days after it goes to press. To get around that limitation, the editorial office of VO began to recommend and call for what it terms "material of a broad nature that contains a certain type of quite general guidance," convinced and aware that the newspaper could not fulfill even its primary and essential function of transmitting party guidance in adequate time.



One of the leaders in exile admits: "To this day, we know that a communist in Brazil, taking and reading the VO, does not know what the party wants or is asking to be done in his factory, his school, not even in his state." In any case, he and other leaders admit that "recently the flow in both directions--from the party in Brazil to its leadership abroad and vice versa--has improved greatly, since the outbreak of the last year's strike and student movements.

Today the text of the VO is more lively and journalistic. It has rejected, has shunned, the old techniques and cliches of the language of the Brazilian communist press. The explanation they give is that all of that is due not only to a greater participation of journalists in the preparation and production of the paper. Those journalists also existed in other PCB papers, including the VO published in Brazil. In exile, it is being put out predominantly by politicians, many of them without having had any noteworthy time or experience in newspaper offices, but who as politicians have improved and simplified their language.

Another observation about this evolution of the journalistic text of the VO from another member of the Central Committee stresses the contribution made by the reader of the newspaper, himself. "He was the first to demand simple sentences, really popular communication, that would cease to be convoluted," that other leader declared.

#### Party Newspaper

Who runs the VO in exile? It is always the leadership of the party. The harmony between the leadership of the party and its newspaper is complete, especially between the Secretariat, the Executive Committee and the newspaper itself.

Unable to reveal an address, conscious of the risks (of postal censorship) to which the PCB members who tried to write to their newspaper would expose themselves, the VO keeps itself informed, seeks to gather and balance the reactions of its readers in Brazil by maintaining what they call a "diffuse flow" of information and opinions through the great network the party maintains in the country. That "diffuse flow" transmits to the VO in exile not only the receptiveness of its reader but also reports about what is being done and thought in the country.

The observation that the VO has reflected--particularly in the last 6 months--the internal differences and contradictions of the party is rejected by the leaders. "That is not quite true," they say. "There is an exaggeration in that conclusion. The VO has sought to take into account and to reflect two things: first, the situation in the country; second, adherence to the party line, to the evolution of its policy. Anyone who takes a collection of VO's and compares what was produced by its editorial

staff and its collaborators with the party documents will see that the margin of difference between the two is very small. At the most, what took place was a new approach to certain subjects and problems that required updating. For that reason, at some points it became necessary, almost indispensable to make way for a more speculative treatment of those subjects and problems.

Admitting that the editorial staff of the VO is comprised of a fixed nucleus, a really small team, the communist leaders deny the reports that in many cases that editorial nucleus has exercised the function of a pressure group on them when they were taking positions and decisions in the name of the PCB. At the most, they say, it happened (and still happens) that the combined leadership of the party assumed positions different from, contrary to, those of the VO editorial staff.

#### CC Members' Activities Abroad

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 8 (Special Supplement)

[Text] The PCB now has 250 leaders and high-level members, organized, working almost exclusively for or in terms of the party in Western and Eastern Europe. They are dispersed and active in at least 10 capitals and large cities: Paris, Brussels, Moscow, Lisbon, Milan, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Prague, Bucharest and, sometimes, Rome.

Added to those who are still in Havana, Mexico and Mozambique, they total 350--400 less than the number about 8 months ago, when many of them began an operation of discreet and gradual return to Brazil.

Among those in exile, 18 are members of a Central Committee currently made up of 20 members. That Central Committee continues to be the principal party leadership organ, functioning and deciding (at meetings that are generally held once a month) with a polemic spirit, availing itself widely of the right to criticize and differ.

It is a Central Committee that in the final analysis is less and less reverent and timid with regard to the secretary general, the legendary and charismatic Luis Carlos Prestes, whose importance, moral authority, "glorious history," a whole inestimable page of services it continues to recognize, without feeling obliged to accept as infallible and irrevocable the "strength of the myth."

The exodus of that group of men and women began in 1971. It was never an act of their own choosing. It was always imposed on them by the need to survive physically and politically the action of a regime that at various times since 1964 tried to suppress them physically and politically.

The last to leave the country did so at the end of 1966. They represent the minority of the leadership group "taken out of Brazil," always by decision of others who were already "outside," always under adventurous circumstances about which even now we cannot have an exact account.

They are also the ones who have not gotten adjusted to exile. In some cases, they are the ones who continue to establish a subtle distinction between the marginal status imposed by life and action underground and that of exile, frequently with nostalgia for the first and older experience.

In Eastern and Western Europe until a very short time ago not a few of them lived like the character in Caetano Veloso's song and poem of "traveling against the wind, without a kerchief and without identification." But with the disadvantage of rarely having "the sun of near-December" in the sky of this older world.

They have never failed to rely on the international solidarity of other communist parties, of union movements, and even on the more discreet and decisive support of some governments, for food, clothing and lodging and to pursue the tasks the party assigns to them.

At the last festivals of L'UNITA and L'HUMANITE, official organs of the Italian and French communist parties, that international solidarity was converted into something concrete and substantial. The PCB leadership in exile received \$15,000 from each one of them, collected by stalls and stands devoted to Brazil, its music, art and cooking.

"But it is well not to forget that the Brazilian communists, like everyone else, left families and friends in the country, who have not forgotten them or abandoned them. Wherever we were we never failed to receive from Brazil real demonstrations of solidarity and support. Demonstrations, moreover, that have never been lacking for so many other exiles since the world began," says Armenio Guedes, who promises that in Brazil some day there will be a "broad, general and unrestricted accounting by the PCB" for those who want to know how and in what way it is possible to maintain an organized group of party leaders and activists in exile.

To provide more security, in certain circumstances to make the operational force of the PCB leadership in exile more discreet and agile, few of its 18 members of the Central Committee live and operate very long in the same city, in a single house. They move, travel, move frequently, maintaining a permanent and safe reference point that may be the office of a union confederation or the apartment of a "legalized" person, somebody with the status of exile as defined in the country where he is.

Lisbon, Paris, Rome, Milan and Brussels are without doubt the most strategically important and valued cities because of their greater facilities for communication with Brazil and with Brazilians in transit, in short, with the information that is basic for the task of assessment and decision that the exiled leaders must carry out for the party that remains in Brazil.

To believe that all of this is done through sophisticated systems or techniques, like pages or episodes out of books and movies about espionage, is the most mistaken and grotesque thing in the story of the exile of the 18 principal leaders of the PCB. It would be more correct to talk about a Brazilian type of unpretentious, patient artisanship.

In the home of many of those "diabolic" 18 members of the Central Committee, one frequently does not find even a small television set; almost always a battery radio. At the most, a portable recorder, an old refrigerator, and a small record player to hear music from home brought by friends.

The life they lead between a living room and two rooms, with some reference books or books on political science, a table, a few chairs and always a pile of newspapers and magazines from Rio, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, is very reminiscent of monastic life. Except for Luis Carlos Prestes, recognized and treated in Moscow with the honors reserved for the greats of socialism, only two of them own and move about in their own automobiles (two small, second or third-hand cars). The others use mass transit (buses, trains or subways), resorting to taxis only in cases of extreme necessity.

The experience of exile has befallen all of them, but not uniformly. Especially at the moment of rationalizing and analyzing a political event, each of them reflects and transmits the situation, the history, the ideas of each country in which they lived or live the experience of exile; influences or conditioning always present and felt, at the minimum, as an element in the close dialectical confrontations they have at their meetings and in the dialog "at the leadership level."

A small and good example of the different conditioning of exile on the leaders of the PCB is that of the discussion regarding the designation and use of the term "companion"--instead of the old "comrade" between--members, activists and sympathizers of the party.

Apparently it is an unimportant semantic question that can be presented as the proposal of an essential and mini-cultural revolution during the debates of the seventh congress. In defense of the use of the term "companions" (following the example of the Italians and Spaniards), many cite and criticize the militarist inspiration and the distortion of the term "comrade," translated from the Russian "tovarisch," by Mussolini's fascists.



None of this is processed without traumas and conflicts. To suppose that that recycling of ideas and concepts, of political and cultural codes and postulates takes place elegantly in academic discussions, always inspired by the rules of fair play, would be the greatest illusion.

The 18 communist leaders in exile are tense men, with lives and nerves in disarray. Many of them hardly hear from their wives and children. At the same time, they are getting along in years. The youngest one, the unionist Hercules Correa, is 50 years old. The others should be in the 60 to 80 year-old group, with intensely worn lives. For all those reasons, they are as impatient and capricious as, or more so than, the young men.

"The fact that we are in the same boat, exposed to the same risks, does not make us friends and equals in everything. To tell the truth, I even made some enemies among party comrades and the leadership. It is time to say that this is a political party not a gentlemen's club, a Rotary Club," advises one of the 18 who has been living the experience of exile more soberly.

A recent and enlightening example of the sharpness and the unforeseeable consequences of the dialog between them, men and women set apart, forced into an almost daily coexistence that is little renewed and enriched, was the resignation requested by Anita Leocadia Prestes and accepted.

A few days ago, Anita Leocadia, oldest daughter of Luis Carlos Prestes, decided to leave the Central Committee. She did not accept the position of isolation in which she found herself at the end of a number of meetings which her father was unable to attend. She left slamming the door, retaining her status of a simple member, determined to continue in a larger assembly (that of the future Seventh PCB Congress) the defense of the positions and propositions she would like to see introduced in the new party line.

In the opinion of the oldest and most experienced, Anita has not yet learned to lose an argument. They say that Anita got carried away by the excessive ardor she exhibits in the defense of her points of view. Others consider her the victim of an orthodox vision of what happened to Brazil in the last 15 years. All are aware of "how much the Old Man must have been irked by what happened to the daughter that most resembles him." Some regret but are not greatly impressed by the episode, accepting it as a positive symptom, a sign of the times of transition that the party is facing. Perhaps the augury of a collective leadership.

#### 'Survivor of Many Splits'

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 8 (Special Supplement)

[Text] The two great splits of the PCB that gave rise to the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B) and the Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (PCBR) already have their important place in the history of the Brazilian

left. Without them, it is not possible to understand why at the beginning of this decade there appeared groups prepared to challenge the post-1964 governments militarily.

The communist schism goes back to the end of the fifties--a perplexing moment for the Brazilian left which, after the aborted attempt at seizing power in 1935, again posed the question of gaining victory by force of arms. The discussion was stimulated in 1956 by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which proclaimed de-Stalinization and then admitted the possibility of the "peaceful road to socialism."

Before the 20th CPSU Congress, the insurrectional road was actually pondered by the Brazilian communists. In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the frenzied August Manifesto was released, containing the watchword for the formation of a Democratic Front of National Liberation with the aim of overthrowing the Getulio Vargas government. A selfcriticism by Secretary General Luis Carlos Prestes buried the front a year later.

According to the American historian, Ronald Chilcote, in the book, "The Brazilian Communist Party - Conflict and Integration," the PCB had already anticipated the new directives coming from Moscow when it supported the election of Juscelino Kubitschek in 1955, a procedure it would repeat with regard to the candidacy of Marshal Teixeira Lott, in the 1960 presidential elections.

That same year, the communists held the fifth party congress after long discussions in which for the first time the pro-Moscow position of Luis Carlos Prestes was openly criticized. The congress merely caused the differences between the Prestes supports and the faction led by the leaders Pedro Pomar, Joao Amazonas and Mauricio Grabois to become irreconcilable.

Among other procedures, the fifth congress approved changes in the status, modifying the internationalist designation of the Communist Party of Brazil to the Brazilian Communist Party and excluding the dictatorship of the proletariat from its program objectives. The object of those changes was to prepare the way for the return of the communists to legal status, which would permit the party to contend for the preference of the electorate along with the other organizations.

The Pomar, Grabois and Amazonas group rebelled and left the PCB, accusing the Prestes line of being "revisionist." In 1962 they founded a dissident party that restored the original acronym PC do B and proclaimed themselves to be the only repository of "Leninist revolutionary tradition," lining up on the side of China in the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, which was then reaching its peak.

After the victory of the 1964 military movement, Prestes' position suffered another siege, this time involving broader sectors of the PCB, who had always accepted with mistrust the alliance of the party leadership with the

Joao Goulart government. In view of the defeat of the leftists, they began to preach violence as the only tactic compatible with the new Brazilian situation. The internal struggle forced the convocation of the sixth congress, held in Sao Paulo, which concluded in 1967 revealing a deep crisis in the PCB.

Under the leadership of Carlos Marighela and Joaquim Camara Toledo, the Sao Paulo state committee preached armed struggle, and in an alliance with the faction commanded by Mario Alves and Apolonio Carvalho as well as the support of Manuel Jover Teles, it almost succeeded in defeating the remainder of the party led by Luis Carlos Prestes.

Marighela did not heed the deliberations of the sixth congress, which reiterated the line that was being followed. He left the PCB and went to Cuba to participate in the Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) where, inspired by the theory of guerrilla nucleus [foco] of the Frenchman, Regis Debray, he formed the National Liberation Alliance (ALN), together with Camara Ferreira, the first leftist organization to adopt the urban guerrilla tactic in Brazil.

It was at that time that the PC do B moved part of its cadres to the Araguaia area, where it would try to open a nucleus of guerrilla activity in the Amazon jungle. After operations carried out between 1972 and 1974, the details of which only now are beginning to be revealed, the guerrilla band was annihilated by the army.

In 1968, another spurt of dissidence from the PCB, led by Mario Alves and Apolonio de Carvalho, formed the Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party, an added designation ["revolutionary"] with which they sought to indicate their equidistance from the PCB and ALN oppositions.

Although they condemned Prestes' reformist line, the leaders of the PCBR also excluded the alternative followed by Marighela, declaring that the insurrection must begin in the countryside and would be successful only to the extent that the structures of the new party were consolidated in the cities.

With the arrest and death of Mario Alves, which occurred in 1970, the PCBR was routed by the security organs, forcing its other founder, Apolonio de Carvalho, to flee abroad. The same would occur with the ALN after Carlos Marighela died in 1969.

When the first armed actions had already been unleashed by the ALN, a new dissidence arose in the PCB--the 8 of October Revolutionary Movement (MR-8) (the date of the death of Che Guevara). Originally made up of some party rank-and-file from the student sector, the MR-8 operated in the urban guerrilla movement of the seventies, including in joint action with other far leftist organizations, but ended up being routed.

## JP Supplement Background

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 8 (Special Supplement)

[Text] In June, at the meeting of the laborites in Lisbon, promoted by Leonel Brizola, there was a report that the leaders of the PCB in exile were thinking of convening a party congress, especially to discuss adaptation of the line of action to the new times that were being proclaimed in Brazil with the amnesty plan. It immediately raised the idea of preparing a reportage involving those people who direct the action of Brazilian communism from various European capitals.

The JORNAL DO BRASIL correspondent in Rome, Araujo Netto, made the first contacts. The proposal was studied. Opposition had to be overcome. It was doubted that it would be possible to talk with Anita Leocadia, the most orthodox of that leadership group, living isolated in Moscow at the side of her father, Secretary General Luis Carlos Prestes. Giocondo Dias-- Corporal Dias, who maintained a socialist government in Rio Grande do Norte for 4 days and nights in 1935--thought it over for 3 days before agreeing to an interview.

Araujo Netto, provided himself with tickets, money, cameras, a recorder and a lot of patience-- and, after all, it was possible to dispense with the latter. Because, suddenly interested in discussing the values of democracy and to show their capacity for coexisting with it, those leaders agreed to come out from underground for a moment. In a week of walking through the streets of Paris, Rome and Milan, he gathered enough material to transform the planned reportage into a special supplement, complemented by work produced in Brazil by the political editorial staff.

### 'Swing of the Pendulum'

Pio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 29 Jul 79 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] Human experience teaches individuals more quickly than societies. The pendulum swing of history verifies that man collectively sometimes identifies with the need for reforms and other times feels the desire for stability. The oscillation is the result of that practical verification and, consequently, of a slow learning process. There is no other reason why human freedoms have again acquired universal strength after a prolonged experience of reforms.

In the countries that hold periodic elections, the historic pendulum has been swinging toward a correction of the excesses of reformism that always limit freedoms. Every day, societies are again showing preference



for political stability, and with the already established methods of coping with problems such as inflation, technological challenges, industrial growth, improvement of the quality of life and leisure. The British have returned the Conservatives to power. The Swedes have taken a holiday from their socialism, which, though democratic, proved to be monotonous and bureaucratic. Spain succeeded in passing from a prolonged dictatorship to a democratic regime, which by representative determination established the communists as a minority. They refuted the myth that the regimes of the right inevitably give way to regimes of the left. After the explosion, Portugal also ended up rejecting the radicalism of the Marxist formulas and, through elections, opted for the preservation of political freedoms.

The communists, at least in the European countries, are beginning to show that they have learned a little the lesson of our times. In Italy and France, having ascertained the impossibility of gaining power, either on their own or with allies of the moment, they are reformulating their convictions. They are already renouncing some dogmas that characterized them as incapable of democratic coexistence. Eurocommunism is the expression of that gaining of awareness regarding the need to surrender to the evidence of the prevailing democratic sentiment in the world.

In Brazil, however, the communists appear to be far from having assimilated the lesson obvious to all. They are still living in the age of tough talk. They prefer theories to the reality that refutes them. To hammer out watchwords does not replace the need for political debate. They will come to realize, later as always, incidentally, that Brazilian society wants freedoms more than pretexts to destroy them.

Even at its advanced age, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) has not succeeded in gaining experience. Its theoretical obsession was always incapable of capturing the Brazilian social and political essence, before and after 1964. The Brazilian communists continue to discuss endlessly among themselves, like a club of lunatics. Far from home, they engage in a chronic, internal appraisal that never gets anywhere.

The democratic opening has been proposed and is underway. It is an opportunity for all Brazilians, not excluding the communists. But they exclude themselves. Because of excessive attachment to theory, they continue to be dogmatic and unrealistic. They say that history does not repeat itself, but they repeat themselves endlessly, as if their capability to err were a mythological curse they cannot escape.

The problems that preoccupy them today, enormously late, may be examined in the Special Supplement which the JORNAL DO BRASIL publishes today as a contribution to the national political debate.

They are men whom the long time in exile and the distance from events has offered the opportunity for objective impartiality. However the most prominent personalities of the PCB spent all of that time outside of Brazil without showing that they had lived in Europe. The debate that exposed the guts of Marxism, like an anatomy class, in France, Italy and Spain, does not seem to have taught them an elementary lesson about how to live in a democracy. And, after all, they were not in the North Pole or Siberia.

However, unless they show, and with conviction, a willingness to renounce some fallacious principles of Marxism, it is likely that they will have little to do in Brazil except to repeat the same mistakes. The prerequisite for their return is not amnesty but the proper demonstration of their repudiation of the Stalinist heritage. They will be knocking at the wrong door if they bring back the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat to offer a country thirsting for democracy.

They will have to show in practice that they accept a multiparty system, and not simply as a bourgeois stage but as an irreplaceable means of democratic coexistence. As long as they do not denounce the violations of human rights in so-called socialist countries, they will not have the credibility or trust to seek participation in a regime of freedoms.

Brazil, of its own accord, is turned toward a democratic course. The Brazilian communist leaders, however, believe that they can replace the knowledge of Brazilian social aspirations with a handful of abstract ideas, formulas that have not succeeded in convincing any country to accept them democratically.

The truth is that the great adversary of Marxism has been democracy. The communists have been successively defeated by the confrontation of ideas, by debate and by vote. And the democratic regimes have become more and more an insoluble problem for communist strategy and tactics, but through competition not through exclusion. The history of our day has taught that the guarantee of freedoms is an effective barrier to communist aims. Democracy has become for them a much greater problem than they manage to be for democracy. Brazil is in the same situation: as the democratic opening imposes sincerity and objectivity on the debate, the communists launch into internal differences. After that, they will cast themselves upon their possible allies, prompted by that same intolerance that stems from the impotence of having to exist under conditions that do not favor their aims. The freedoms that already defend us are presenting their first results. There will be others.

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## COMMUNIST LEADER IN EXILE VOICES VIEWS

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 1 Jul 79 pp 8-9

[Interview with Brazilian Communist Party Secretary General Luis Carlos Prestes by Claudio Kuck, in Rome and Paris; date not indicated]

[Text] In connection with the 80th birthday of Luis Carlos Prestes, O GLOBO authorized its correspondent Claudio Kuck to seek an interview with the old communist leader, which could provide an extensive statement on his public life in his 55 years of militant activity.

Contacts were made in various parts of Europe before Prestes agreed to talk with O GLOBO. Finally he expressed willingness, but demanded a promise in advance that we would publish the interview in full. At first he was very reluctant, even warning our correspondent in good humor during one of their meetings that he should not convert the informal talk they were having into an interview: "You see," he said, "I am not giving an interview. You are not going to do what those reporters from FOLHA DE SAO PAULO did with Figueiredo, talking with him and then publishing it all as an interview. You'll see that I'll deny it as well...." Finally, he accepted the 57 questions (some of them complex) submitted by O GLOBO, and returned them some days later having set aside 39 and answering only 18.

He set aside all the questions of a historical nature, saying: "This is in the history books, it suffices to look and see what I said and did. You can do that. What is of interest is what is happening and what remains to be written."

When he returned his answers, moreover, Prestes expressed readiness to talk at a little greater length, an opportunity of which Kuck took advantage to insist on certain questions in the written questionnaire which he had not answered. Prestes responded naturally, leading Kuck to comment: "He was much more impassioned and adamant about the world situation and that in Brazil in his written answers than he proved when speaking of the same subjects in ordinary conversation. He does not talk in worn-out and threadbare cliches, as might be expected from his written answers." When they said goodbye, he gave warning again: "You'll see to it then that this interview is published? And in full?"

Claudio Kuck hastened away to the nearest cafe (the last meeting was in Paris) to put down in writing as faithfully as possible the dialog which had just ended.

Some time has passed since then. The commitment to publish in full demanded by Prestes earlier suffered some prejudice due to his decision, which had not been announced at that time, to make of his interview a document of pure political propaganda, instead of the statement requested. As no date was set for the commitment, the interview was held for a better time, which has now developed, since Luis Carlos Prestes, the name heading the initial list of those suspended by the revolution, sees a prospect of benefiting from amnesty granted by President Joao Figueiredo.

Since the informal talk was considerably more interesting than the written interview (which was characterized by the old cliches of the communist leader), we decided to give it featured treatment. We also deem it desirable to publish the list of questions Prestes did not answer, and they are all here.

Prestes is in Russia now recovering from an operation for cataracts, and according to his wife, Dona Maria, is doing well. She spoke to O GLOBO last Thursday to report that despite the amnesty, Prestes does not intend to return to Brazil "while the National Security Law remains in effect." And Dona Maria added: "Amnesty is fine, but with this law in effect we cannot think of returning."

In our two meetings in Rome and then Paris, the old communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes spoke of many things. We talked about his family, his exile, his military life, Getulio Vargas, the lieutenants, the 1964 movement, redemocratization, his famous Column and many other things. The following is a summary of what he said.

[Question] What is your life in Moscow like?

[Answer] I am always giving lectures, seeing comrades, doing things. I also travel a great deal. This year I went to Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, France and Yugoslavia to participate in congresses and political meetings. And shortly I will travel to Cuba, and also to many other places before the end of the year.

Prestes is living in apartment KB 69 at number 9 Gorki Avenue in Moscow. He does not have his own car, but the state makes one available to him. He is an official guest and has every facility for his work. He dresses simply, almost never wearing a tie. He is married to Dona Maria Ribeiro, the widow of a Sao Paulo labor leader killed by the police in Santos in the time of Governor Ademar de Barros. The couple has two children who are there in Moscow, along with two others from her first marriage.

[Question] Have your children adapted well in the Soviet Union?



[Answer] Quite. They speak good Russian, are studying, have good friends and grades, but just the same they would like to be living in Brazil. They like Brazilian music very much too. They are young and they are always receiving the latest music from Brazil and they popularize it all. They are great promoters of our music and the Soviets like it. Just recently there was a protest song festival, and they won with an interpretation of their own compositions in Portuguese. First they explained the lyrics in Russian. I think that they have Russian versions of various Brazilian musical successes.

We asked about his childhood and why he entered military school. He said he was born in Porto Alegre on 3 January 1898, the son of Lt Antonio Pereira Prestes (a positivist) and Dona Leocadia Felizardo, but that they soon went to Rio de Janeiro, moving almost constantly because of his father's transfers. The family was poor and was in a worse situation still when the father died in 1908, when Prestes was only 10 years old. He had the option of entering the military school, which was free and where officers' sons had preference. As is known, his grades were always brilliant and his record is one of the best ever up to the present at the military school. In 1920 he graduated from the Realengo Military School as an engineering lieutenant. Among his comrades were Juarez Tavora, Siqueira Campos, Carlos da Costa Leite, Eduardo Gomes, Cordeiro de Farias and Newton Prado--the generation which produced the "18 of the Fort" and the "lieutenants." In Realengo too he was a top-ranking student and leader. He regrets that he was unable to participate in the uprising on 5 July 1922 because he was ill with typhoid fever. Subsequently he was transferred to Rio Grande do Sul.

[Question] Why did you ask to resign from the army when you were only 26 and from every indication would have had a brilliant military career ahead of you?

[Answer] In fact I was in the military a very short time. I think it was because I was always a rebel, and could never keep quiet about injustices. I could not manage it. I became a lieutenant in 1920 and already in 1924 I submitted my resignation from the army because, in the assignment they gave me in Rio Grande do Sul, supervising the construction of barracks, I reported the maneuvering and dealing of all kinds which was going on there and no one would listen. I protested, I sent reports and complaints and got no response. I decided to go to Rio, without authorization, to report orally, but they would not listen to me there either. Instead, they sent me off to direct a section of railroad construction in the mission region of Rio Grande do Sul. Shortly thereafter I decided to resign. When summoned to Rio, I went to talk with Capt Jose Bentes Monteiro, who must have been the father of this Euler who now wants to be a candidate in Brazil. He was on the staff of Calogeras, who was then minister of war. He wanted to know the reason for my resignation and I explained it all in detail--my work, and the shady dealings I could not fail to report. In the end, that was how it was left and I abandoned the army, although not my military comrades, who continued with me in various revolutionary movements against that whole state of affairs.

On 5 July 1924 there was an uprising led by Gen Isidoro Dias Lopes and on 29 October Prestes led a rebellion of the railroad battalion which had been under his command and then decided to go along with the other revolutionary troops. On 12 April 1925 there was a conference of the revolutionary leaders. Prestes suggested a long march through Brazil to seek support and attack the government. As a result, the movement which went down in history as the "Prestes Column" proceeded throughout the interior of Brazil for two years and three months. It is said that they marched 24,000 kilometers, but Prestes gives assurance that it was 36,000.

[Question] What were you seeking with the Column? How did it contribute to your development, your later support of Marxism-Leninism?

[Answer] In the Column, after so much time had passed, I had to realize that we were very naive. We knew nothing of ideology or sociology, nothing. We knew that we opposed injustice, that we wanted a just state and an end to the old oligarchy, but we had no idea how this could be achieved or how to create change. But during the long march I saw so much misery, illness, I felt how our people really live, their terrible conditions. This really revolted and changed me. It changed me greatly. Some others went over to the other side later, forgetting what they had seen. Not I. I could not forget what I had seen and felt. Nor could Siqueira Campos, who remained always on the side of the people as well.

[Question] What were the battles of the Column like?

[Answer] Gois Monteiro said that I always avoided battle and fled, and that I was not a warrior, that I did not wage war according to his manual. He only understood battle in terms of the books, the classic manuals and many other works. And obviously, we had no ammunition and we were forced to act thus. With time we adapted our combat technique to the conditions we found and the resistance we encountered. The man who understood this very well was Gen Bertoldo Klinger. He waged battle against the Column and he knew we did not have much ammunition, and for this reason he used trucks rather than the classic trenches in order to have greater mobility in pursuing us. However we went into the forest where the trucks could not follow and they were unable to detain us.

In February 1927 Prestes went into Bolivia with his Column of 620 men, while Siqueira Campos went with another group of 65 to Paraguay. He lived in exile in Bolivia, going later to Argentina, where he established contact with such communist leaders as Rodolfo Ghioldi and others. Many emissaries visited him during the preparations for the 1930 revolution, and the military leadership of the movement was even offered to him. However he refused. He said that he already felt that his would be a different path, "seeking more radical changes and not simply a transition from one oligarchy to another." To the point that he declared himself a communist in an open letter dated 12 March 1931. He lived for some years in the Soviet Union and then returned to Brazil to participate in the 1935 revolt. He was arrested and spent nine years in the cells of the New State of Getulio Vargas.

[Question] One of the subjects most debated in Brazil has always been your attitude toward Getulio Vargas, mainly your alliance with him after the episode involving your wife Olga Benario. What is your version of these events, your view of Getulio?

[Answer] I do not want to speak of individuals, for I might cause hurt by stating the truth about many people. This would not be a good political position at the moment. For example, there are many people now who want to deify Getulio again. As for me, they call me insensitive, a traitor, because I reached an agreement with him, the man who was the murderer of my German wife Olga, whom he sent to Hitler's concentration camps. But there was no other way, and those opposing Getulio in that era were even worse than he. It was very important that Brazil immediately abandon its love affair with the Nazis and Fascists and fight on the side of the Allies. Moreover, our communists were not bold enough in 1945 after the coup to go and talk personally with Getulio in Sao Borja, to suggest an alliance and see what could be done. Getulio's prestige with the workers' class was tremendous, so great that when Getulio ordered them to vote for Dutra, many of our worker members went to the party headquarters in Sao Paulo to turn in their registration cards and the ballots for Getulio Fiuza, saying that they could not vote for him because Getulio wanted Dutra and they were with him. But nothing, absolutely nothing can excuse his crimes.

[Question] Why didn't the PCB [Brazilian Communist Party] support Getulio in the 1950 elections and in his second government? He even denounced imperialism in his famous letter testament, did he not?

[Answer] By 1950 we were already engaging in self-criticism and we debated this matter at length at our congresses. In fact we were wrong in failing to support him, and by the end of his government he was in fact nationalist. And at the polls the Brazilian people did what we communists should have done, supporting him. But I say again, none of this alters his tremendous guilt or excuses his crimes.

[Question] Why did you and the PCB fail to support the candidacy of Brig Gen Eduardo Gomes?

[Answer] In that era I sent a letter to Dutra through a councilman whose name I do not recall, proposing that elections be held and asking if Dutra would guarantee the legality of the PCB if this should happen. He answered in writing--I have kept the letter to this day--saying that yes, if there were law and order, there would be nothing against a legal status for the PCB. I also wrote to the brigadier general, who failed to answer, nor did he summon me to talk with him. Then, although I had not been invited, I went to his home in Catete. Juarez Tavora and Cordeiro de Farias were there. They were somewhat embarrassed and crestfallen. Throughout the time I was kept in prison by Getulio, they, who now claim to oppose him, had advanced in their careers thanks to Vargas himself. From the conversation I saw that all their intentions were directed toward a coup. I proposed

legality for the PCB and elections. The brigadier general said under Vargas, free elections were impossible. Cordeiro took his hat and left on some pretext, just as I was saying I saw no point in ousting Vargas to the benefit of whom--Linhares, the president of the Supreme Court who in the Vargas and New State era was appointed by Vargas himself? The elections came and the proof that they were working toward a coup is that they were not prepared for the elections, for they were planning only a coup and were not in a position to wage a real electoral campaign. The people did not want them. They represented North American interests. The brigadier general was the candidate of the U.S. embassy. The people did not believe in him.

Prestes further said that among his military colleagues he always criticized the coup technique, and that the lieutenants of 1922 became the promulgators of the coups in 1945 and 1964.

[Question] What was your life as a prisoner under the New State like?

[Answer] They tried to make my life as difficult as possible. They did not allow me books, they censored my letters, they would not give me paper or a pen, and there was physical and moral torture. When the Nazis reached Paris and France fell, they took me into a room where there were newspapers on the table reporting these events and the Nazi victories. And they left the window of the room open, staging a whole scenario to simulate my suicide. In other words, they tempted me to bring about my own end.

Prestes emerged from prison in time for the 1945 electoral campaign and the short two-year period (until 1947) out of its total of 56 years of existence in which the Brazilian Communist Party was entirely legal.

[Question] The PCB emerged from clandestinity in 1945 to achieve relative success in the elections, with nine percent of the vote, electing 14 federal deputies and you as senator. To what do you attribute this vote?

[Answer] It was a moment of relief, of jubilation with the victory over the Nazis and the success of the Soviet troops against Hitler contributed to this. In fact, we elected 16 deputies, 14 and 2 others, since I was elected federal deputy for Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul and the Federal District, as well as senator for the Federal District. Obviously the image of the era of the Column also contributed to this result. We showed that if the people were allowed to vote freely the PCB would have success, but then we launched our campaign for a million votes and the reactionary forces were frightened, so that they made us illegal again.

[Question] The history books say that the short period as a member of the constituent assembly was not easy for you, or for Carlos Marighela and the other Communist Party deputies elected at the end of 1945. Your colleagues in the Congress, such as Prado Kelly, Juracy Magalhães, Daniel Faraco, Batista Luzardo, Glicerio Alves, Hamilton Nogueira, Ataliba Nogueira, Segadas Vianna and others were always trying to place you in a position where you had to choose between Brazil and the Soviet Union, isn't that true?



[Answer] In fact this happened constantly. We had to divert our attention from the most important discussion in that era, i.e. the achievement of a truly popular and democratic constitution, to demonstrate that we were Brazilians and not Russians. There was even a famous discussion about what side I would take in the event of a war between Brazil and the Soviet Union. A completely irrelevant and senseless question. Once another congressman, I do not remember who, but I think it was Hermes Lima, even said: "You members of the Constituent Assembly are insisting that Mr Prestes be a professor in Russia." But I think that our party made its contribution, despite the reactionary forces which prevented the achievement of a truly popular and non-oligarchic constitution.

[Question] What personalities impressed you most?

[Answer] As I have already said, I do not want to analyze any personality, because I do not believe this is the time for criticisms and views which might lead to a lack of unity. However even so I would say that one of those who impressed me most and whom I regard as one of the greatest of those I have known and shared experience with is Campos. Truly he was a great patriot, but not one of those of the yellow-green variety, no. He was a true, positive patriot, an honest man of character, fairness, courage and integrity. When I issued my famous manifesto which caused such an uproar, he was the only one of the former comrades in revolutionary struggle who came to discuss the matter with me. And we talked non-stop for 10 days. We had violent but sincere disagreements. Then he went to Sao Paulo and he asked me to wait 15 days before publishing my manifesto. He said that I would cause a rebellion in the country. And he made bombs, buying pieces of pipe which he filled with dynamite. Then he arranged for a guard on the houses of democratic politicians in the opposition. He said that if they talked against the government, they would have to have the courage to proceed to action as well. The truth is that all the other "lieutenants" and revolutionaries of that time went over to the other side in the end, agreeing to exchange one oligarchy for another, except for Siqueira Campos, who remained faithful to the people and their sufferings to the end. He was a very sarcastic individual with a fine sense of humor. Many were afraid of him and they feared him because they did not know when he was serious and when he was joking, whether he was simply having fun with him, such was his sarcasm.

[Question] But what about someone, perhaps in Brazil's more recent history?

[Answer] Another Brazilian who is one of those I most respect and admire is the Catholic attorney Sobral Pinto. He is a notable man. He defended me when I was in prison under the New State, despite the fact that I did not seek his defense. But he was not just a superficial attorney as often happened in that era. He really was honest, although we had entirely different ideas. We talked and discussed a great deal, perhaps trying to convince each other. In that era those discussions were very good for me, except that I could not convert him to communism and he could not make me

a Catholic. But we understood each other. One time the deputy commander of the Special Police was present during one of our talks, when I was supposed to make a deposition and provide testimony for Sobral, my lawyer, to use in my case. But they would not let me present anything written. I took the paper and began to read, the beginning of my statement being an attack on the Special Police. Two police agents leaped at me, but I tore the paper away and threw it out the window. Sobral Pinto was furious and he too attacked the police. He protested energetically, in indignation that his client had been attacked without justification right in front of him. Really a worthy man. I am grateful to him. But I admit that he is very contradictory. He always struggled against injustice, openly and liberally, but just recently he opposed an advance in our society, the divorce law.

[Question] What recent event in Brazil has impressed you most?

[Answer] Without a doubt this strike in Sao Paulo. It is really an incredible step. Not even in the days of Jango did the state enterprises themselves pay for strike days, as is happening now in the ABC [Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo and Sao Caetano do Sul] districts of Sao Paulo. And the government took no repressive steps. This is the most important thing which has happened in Brazil in recent times. And they added the wage bonus, in complete violation of the government wage policy.

I showed Prestes some of the photographs taken in Rome and he laughed. "They are interesting, but I look more like a tourist in Rome on vacation. See if they don't talk now in Brazil of the golden exile and things of that sort," he commented.

I said that it would be a matter of Moscow gold, and he laughed at length.

Prestes then said that the repression of the Brazilian Communist Party was much worse under the Geisel government than in the Medici days.

"They always say that the Medici government was the most repressive," he commented, "but without a doubt, for us communists, the worst was the Geisel government. To the extent that we had to take a third of our Central Committee outside the country, and we should have sent out many more people."

[Question] You are 80 years old and already accustomed to life in the Soviet Union. Do you still think of returning to Brazil one day?

[Answer] Exile is the most terrible thing there is. I have already spent a large part of my life in exile and now I have been outside Brazil again since 1971. Obviously my dream is to return to Brazil, even at 80-odd years of age.

## The Written Interview

In the interview Secretary General of the Brazilian Communist Party Luis Carlos Prestes gave O GLOBO, he stressed mainly international themes and Brazilian events. He did not want to go into detail about the intensive historical period between 1920 and 1950 when he was an outstanding figure or to speak about or give opinions on other major figures of that era. He said that his opinions about various Brazilian leaders might lead to polemics which would be undesirable at the present time.

He said he favors a constituent assembly and admitted that the events of 1964 took the PCB by surprise. He also attacked the ultra-leftist groups which rob banks and kidnap ambassadors. But before answering the first question, Prestes made a point of making the following statement.

Prestes: In answering some of the questions asked me by O GLOBO, I want to state the following at the outset. I am a leader of the Brazilian Communist Party and as such I must first of all set forth the position of my party as to the political regime which is found in Brazil today. With the military coup of 1964, a military dictatorship serving the domestic and foreign monopolies, particularly U.S. monopolies, was established in Brazil. The documents proving the support and direct aid given to those who brought about the 1964 coup by the United States government of that time, some of them written by Brazilian newsmen, are now well enough known. With the increasing resistance of the Brazilian people to the policy of military dictatorship, it adopted ever more reactionary and fascism-oriented measures which led, with Institutional Act No 5, to the establishment in our country of the military dictatorship which is now headed by Mr Geisel. It should be noted that modern fascism can no longer take the same classic forms as the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini did. It needs to masquerade as democracy, in other words insofar as possible to maintain a parliament which decides nothing, to hold elections, to afford itself the luxury, as it does in Brazil, of replacing the dictator periodically--in other words, one general instead of another, always chosen from the inner group, but also enjoying the confidence of the monopolies and, more particularly, of the Pentagon and the CIA in the United States. But if the form of fascism has changed, its essence continues to be the same, as defined as early as 1935 by the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. "... Open terrorist dictatorship by the most reactionary financial capital..." In the Brazilian case, it is U.S. financial capital. In the almost 15 years which have elapsed since the 1964 coup, many crimes have been committed by the generals' governments which have followed one after the other in power. Thousands of persecuted Brazilian citizens have been compelled to live abroad and as many more were arrested and barbarously tortured, many of them to death, as happened with the young communist Jose Montenegro de Lima in 1975. Even today Mr Geisel still does not want to tell us the whereabouts of the communist leaders--David Capistrano da Costa, Valter Ribeiro, Luis Maranhao Filho, Joao Massena de Melo, Elson Costa, Hiram Lima, Jaime Miranda, Itair Veloso and Orlando Bonfim--who were kidnaped in 1974 and 1975 under his government, and who have

disappeared. If the executioners in his service killed them, let their bodies be delivered to us and the crimes they admitted confessed.

Prestes did not wish to answer the first two questions pertaining to his family and military background, moving directly to the third question, which was as follows.

O GLOBO: As to the army, you have always in earlier statements and, mainly, when you were a Republican senator in the era of the Constituent Assembly, stressed the democratic nature of the Brazilian army. Now that the military have been in power since 1964, what is your position with regard to this same army?

Prestes: It is true that I always stressed the democratic nature of the Brazilian army. In our view this derives basically from the class origin of the majority of its regular cadres. Its officers and sergeants come in large part from the poorest petit bourgeoisie. We should not forget either that, in order to transform the army, or rather the armed forces as a whole, into a pretorian guard for the military dictatorship imposed on the country by the counterrevolutionary military coup in 1964, more than 5,000 officers and sergeants were expelled from the ranks. It is true that within the army there were dozens who agreed to become hangmen and torturers and that the High Command became a tool of the domestic and foreign monopolies, thus becoming accomplices to an important extent in the savage exploitation of our people by the big Brazilian capitalists and estate owners, in association with the foreign oppressors. But it would be an error even now to see a homogeneously reactionary and fascist whole in our army. The majority of its regular cadres are made up of patriots who, despite the fact that they were educated in bestial hatred for communism, will in the end--as the impoverishment of the middle strata of the population of our country becomes more acute, as the struggle of the workers' class against the present regime intensifies--break the bonds of discipline and rank which link them with the current regime to participate in the struggle against the imperialist yoke and for social progress. Moreover, some demonstrations along these lines have already occurred. For this reason, we communists have in all our documents urged the military as a whole to struggle, to join in unity with all the patriots and anti-fascists. The regime for which we are struggling and that to which Brazilian citizens aspire should guarantee the armed forces an important role in the building of democracy and the defense of the sovereignty of the people.

Prestes then declined to answer 23 questions pertaining to the Copacabana fort uprising in 1922, the "lieutenants" movement, the 1924 revolt, the founding of the PCB in 1922, the "Prestes Column," his adherence to Marxism-Leninism, the 1930 revolution, his departure for the Soviet Union, the establishment of the National Liberating Alliance, the 1935 revolt, the rise of fascism in Brazil, the Getulio Vargas era, the New State, his prison experience, and the war. He then answered the following questions.



O GLOBO: In the World War II era, you defended the convocation of a constituent assembly and amnesty, the same possibilities as are being discussed in Brazil today. What is your view? In that era you asked for broad amnesty for all political prisoners except "naturally, spies and proven fifth columnists" (the word used by Prestes at the time). What is your position as to broad amnesty in Brazil today? Do you agree with those who say that it should be total and reciprocal?

Prestes: In 1945, we did in fact participate in the struggle for amnesty, but faced with the threat of a military coup planned by the UDN [National Democratic Union] with the open support of the then-ambassador of the United States, Mr Adolfo Berle, and the provocative urging of a broad and unlimited amnesty by Mr Carlos Lacerda, which he knew would not be viable so long as General Dutra was minister of war, we replaced that slogan with a simple "Freedom for the political prisoners." And this was what we achieved on 18 April 1945, which was not effectively an amnesty. Today we are struggling for broad and unlimited amnesty. And although we have no interest in demanding that it be reciprocal, since it is not for us to struggle for the interests of the hangmen of the reactionary regimes, we go farther when in our party documents we state specifically that we are in no way "revanchist." We are persuaded that this is a just political position for the moment in which we find ourselves.

Prestes then set aside the questions concerning his support of Getulio Vargas despite what he suffered at the hands of his police force and the fact that Vargas sent his wife Olga to a Nazi concentration camp, where she died. He proceeded to the next question.

O GLOBO: Why did you support Getulio Vargas in office during that era of struggle for the constituent assembly? In your view, could there be any historical link today between a constituent assembly and Geisel? Many people are talking about this in Brazil. What is your view and position?

Prestes: Despite the fact that it has been repeated for many years now that the communist struggled for a constituent assembly with Getulio Vargas in 1945, this is not true. It was the laborites and the Vargas faction which adopted this slogan. The communists fought only for the election of a constituent assembly. At the current time we are in fact urging the convocation of a constituent assembly, but we are stating expressly that it can only represent the interests of the Brazilian people following the prior achievement of amnesty, the democratic freedoms, free discussion and free expression of thought, in other words, the fall of the present regime, and therefore Mr Geisel's tyranny. Returning to the matter of 1945, it should be stressed that even before World War II ended, democratic freedoms and free organizations for political parties had been won, and immediately after the release of the political prisoners, a legal status for the Communist Party was achieved.

O GLOBO: In your view, could there be a democratic opening in Brazil with a more drastic break, as was the case in Portugal and Spain, including the legalization of the Communist Party, or would it come about in a slower and more gradual fashion? What experience can Brazil derive from the Portuguese and Spanish models?

Prestes: Naturally we study the experience of other peoples to draw lessons which may be useful for us. The examples of Portugal and Spain, as well as those of Greece and other peoples which, after many years of oppression, have overthrown fascism, certainly give us assurance that our people too can overthrow fascism. However we cannot at the present time, even on the basis of this rich experience, say either when or how this will come about. Everything depends on the development of the balance of forces, of the extent to which we succeed in organizing and strengthening the anti-fascist forces, as well as the degree of resistance which may be offered by the regime. At the present time the instability of the regime and the isolation of the dictatorship are increasing, and on the other hand, the forces struggling for democratic freedoms are growing, as is demonstrated by the student movement, among other important developments, and more recently, by the great workers' strike in the Sao Paulo ABC. It is still difficult, however, to achieve the necessary coordination among the various factions in public opinion demonstrating their opposition to the arbitrary action and totalitarian authoritarianism of Mr Geisel. Although already considerably weakened, he can still counterattack and he does, as happened last year with the so-called "April packet." As to the experience to be drawn from the so-called Portuguese and Spanish models, I would like to discuss only the main aspect. Both in the case of Spain, where there was no profound change in the old fascist state apparatus, and even in Portugal, where there was a revolution, while the workers' class--the only consistent force in the struggle against the monopolies--did not win hegemony, a political regression is always possible, as can now be seen under the present government.

Prestes then declined to answer 12 questions pertaining to the period of legality for the PCB, his electoral success, the parliamentary experience, the personalities of the era, the candidacy of Yeddo Fiuza, his failure to support Getulio Vargas in 1950, the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the criticism of Stalin, the Kubitschek government, the support of Lott by the PCB, and the Janio Quadros government. He then answered the next question.

O GLOBO: Were the events of 1964 inevitable, in your opinion? Did those events catch the PCB by surprise?

Prestes: The events of 1964 had objective causes. The Brazilian economy had entered into crisis and a situation had been reached in which in order to pursue capitalist development it had become indispensable to replace the existing socioeconomic system by a certain type of state monopolistic capitalism. In order to guarantee their profits, the monopolies needed to place the state authority fully in their service, to prevent the workers' class from pursuing the struggle for better wages and other advantages. As

for us, the communists, we were without a doubt taken by surprise by the coup and due to the leftist positions we adopted and the fact we had not criticized the ultra-leftist positions of many people, we contributed to precipitating the clash of the progressive forces with the domestic reactionaries allied with U.S. imperialism, when we were still far from a revolutionary situation. This facilitated the triumph of those promoting the coup, in other words the counterrevolutionaries, who sought to block the paths to socialism and to guarantee the development of capitalism in our country for some time longer. At the Sixth Congress of our party, held in complete secrecy, we had already engaged in criticism and self-criticism concerning that event.

Prestes declined to answer yet another question pertaining to his personal views about such personalities of that era as Brizola, Lacerda, Adhemar de Barros, Magalhaes Pinto, Jango, Castelo Branco and Arrais. He proceeded to the next question.

O GLOBO: What is your explanation of the creation of the so-called "Broad Front" and the support given it by the PCB, in alliance even with Carlos Lacerda?

Prestes: In its constant struggle for democratic freedoms and the interests of the workers, our party has always made efforts with a view to unifying all the political positions taking a stand against the reactionaries and desiring to participate in actions against the common enemy, at each historic moment. If political forces against which we have waged battle change position and can contribute to broadening the single front for action against the reactionaries, even if it be only to take one step with us, we will never hesitate to advance together with them. In the case of the so-called "Broad Front," it was not we communists who changed, but Mr Carlos Lacerda, who supported the 1964 coup and later, for reasons which only he could explain, turned against the government of the generals who promoted the coup. And precisely for this, he lost his political rights in the end.

O GLOBO: In your view, might the Broad Front have avoided Institutional Act No 5, or did it serve to precipitate it?

Prestes: In politics one cannot reason on a hypothetical, conditional basis of "if." But we must admit that, however minor its role, the Broad Front contributed to developing mass actions against the dictatorship and it was these actions which frightened the dictatorship. With Institutional Act No 5, the dictatorship sought to contain the growing resistance, opposition and struggle of our people against the reactionary regime imposed by the 1964 coup. Despite the reactionary nature of the 1967 constitution, or semi-fascist as we called it at the time, it had already begun to make the defense of the interests of the domestic and foreign monopolies more difficult. As a result of the growing movement of the masses for freedom and the release of the political prisoners, the Federal Supreme Court had already begun to release them and, what is more important, the Parliament did not reveal much willingness to approve the laws of a financial nature

which Mr Delfim Neto wanted to guarantee greater profits for the domestic and foreign monopolies, and mainly for U.S. bankers and financial capital. Mr Costa e Silva achieved all this with a simple stroke of the pen, when he signed Institutional Act No 5. The most reactionary regime in the nation's history was established, and the military regime imposed took one more step along the path toward fascist totalitarianism with the military junta of 1969 and the changes introduced in the constitution.

O GLOBO: There were various attempts at armed resistance to the military government, above all after Institutional Act No 5. Why did the PCB condemn this type of action? Do you believe that later event showed that this policy on the part of the PCB was the proper one?

Prestes: In fact, we criticized the ultra-leftist groups which robbed banks, kidnaped ambassadors and spoke of creating centers of armed struggle and guerrilla forces in the rural sector or even the cities. We favored a difficult ideological struggle as opposed to this tactical orientation in the struggle, within the ranks of our party as well, where such trends also developed. At the time we stressed that only the great masses led by the workers' class, organized and united, were in a position to overthrow fascism. But this required an arduous and slow effort along with the workers in the struggle for their most immediate claims. We also sought to show that subordinating the tactic of struggle against the dictatorship to a given form of struggle, in this case armed struggle by small groups isolated from the masses, was an error. In the end it would serve the purposes of the reactionaries themselves, as has already been demonstrated throughout the world. We realize however that the numerous groups which developed then included a number of honest and combative individuals, but that the very form of action they adopted meant inevitably that they would join with adventurers capable of every folly. It seems to us that the practice in the years which followed has already shown who was or is right. The ultra-left has practically disappeared in our country now with the assassination of its main leaders by the reactionaries. Our party, despite the harsh blows it has suffered, particularly since 1974, continues to be alive and active and is already welcoming into its ranks many of those who let themselves be carried along by the partisans of the ultra-left. And now it is beginning to be visible that the work done by the communists in an effort to awaken the popular masses to resistance, opposition and struggle against fascism is beginning to produce its fruit. The workers' class in our country has moved little by little from the struggle against the wage squeeze to the "turtle" strikes, the so-called "Operation Enthusiasm," the use of the vote as a tool of protest in the 1974 and 1976 elections, the struggle to win the 34.1 percent of which the dictatorship robbed them, political statements demanding democratic freedoms, trade-union freedom and the right to strike, and now, they are already proceeding with such important actions as the recent strikes in the Sao Paulo ABC. In truth, the ideas propagated by the communists have won out, after patient work and thanks also to the rebellion provoked by rising costs, growing discontent, the awareness of the working masses. The level of the workers' awareness is rising ever more speedily. And as Marx said, when ideas succeed the masses become a force.



O GLOBO: How do you view the present economic situation in Brazil?

Prestes: The present economic situation in Brazil is characterized by the increasing dependence on foreign financial capital, particularly that in the U.S., and the extreme poverty of our people, whose health situation is in fact catastrophic. The country's foreign debt, which is now more than two and a half times the annual value of exports, is tending to increase ever further, since the current policy is to make loans, which means selling the future of our people, on the pretext of developing the national economy. And in turn, in order to guarantee the foreign and domestic monopolies and the multi-national enterprises the highest profits, the dictatorship is drastically limiting wage increases, while at the same time it is incapable of lowering the rate of inflation and rising living costs. According to figures published by the DIEESE [Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Social and Economic Studies] a few days before 1 May, the minimum wage, in order to equal the real minimum wage in 1940, would have to be increased by 117 percent, and as is known, Mr Geisel only increased it 41 percent. How long can the workers' class tolerate this extortion? How long can the small and average farm producers and the middle strata in urban areas go along with the process of impoverishment to which they are being subjected? The recent workers' strikes at numerous enterprises in the ABC districts of Sao Paulo have already shown that the most enlightened nucleus of the proletariat is prepared to win the right to strike and is in a position to defeat the wage policy of the dictatorship, a basic element in its entire policy, which has transformed Brazil into a "paradise" for foreign capital.

O GLOBO: What is your position on the current nuclear debate going on in Brazil and the international area?

Prestes: The Brazilian Communist Party adopted a position of opposition as soon as the nuclear agreement between the Brazilian government and the FRG was announced. Obviously, we are not opposed to the use of this new source of energy in our country for peaceful purposes, which we have made clear in more than one document of the Central Committee of our party. We do not see however the solution suitable to the interests and present and future needs of our country in that agreement. This is a position also shared by two of the most notable Brazilian physicists. We assert therefore that we see military purposes and not just peaceful purposes as Mr Geisel has been repeating in that nuclear agreement. In this connection it is rather significant that the Brazilian government continues to refuse the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has already been signed by more than a hundred nations, and which represents the sole political guarantee that in fact the production of nuclear weaponry on our soil is not being contemplated. The Brazilian generals want to retain the possibility of building the atomic bomb in our country and this is also in the interests of the revanchists in the FRG who, being prevented by the international treaty signed by their government from building atomic weaponry on their soil, see the possibility of doing so on Brazilian territory. We are of the opinion therefore that it is necessary to struggle to prevent the

Brazilian government from converting our country into a base for the production of nuclear weapons. The position of the Brazilian dictatorship is opposed to the policy of world detente and increases the danger of involving our people in a world conflict posing a most serious threat to their future, as to that of the other sister peoples in Latin America. As to the discussion in the international area, it derives from the position of the Carter government, which has come out against the sale of a uranium enrichment plant and another for the use of plutonium to Brazil, which position was reiterated during a press interview in Brasilia at the time of his visit at the end of last March. This position on the part of Mr Carter, which is still at present threatening the world with the construction of such hated weapons of mass extermination as the neutron bomb, obviously does not reflect an honest interest in peace in the world or opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons, but in truth reveals the inter-imperialist contradiction between the German and the U.S. monopolies desiring to dominate the world market when it comes to supplying enriched uranium, a market which is tending to broaden and grow.

O GLOBO: In connection with the international communist movement, how do you view the problem of the opposition between socialist countries such as those between Vietnam and Cambodia, China and the Soviet Union? Is a war between China and the Soviet Union inevitable?

Pre-1981: What characterizes the international communist movement is not the conflict to which you refer, but precisely the contrary, its continued growth, its truly universal breadth and its continuing trend toward unity. What is divided, and increasingly so, by serious contradictions, is the capitalist world. The international communist movement is in truth the largest and most vigorous mass movement existing in the world today. What is happening in China is a temporary phenomenon due to the fact that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party fell into the hands of the nationalist forces, or rather the chauvinists, who had as their leader Mr Mao Zedong. As the leader of the movement for the national liberation of China, Mao Zedong could not have failed to acquire great popular prestige. But although he launched the construction of socialism in the country, the policy of the Maoists some years ago had nothing to do with socialism, the principle of Marxism-Leninism, or proletarian internationalism. It suffices to mention here his viscerally anti-Soviet position, his support of all the reactionary and fascist forces and individuals, and his activity, all of it, oriented toward ensuring the outbreak of a new world war in the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States would clash, so that China would win a position of hegemony as a great world power. With these goals, the Maoists attempt to support adventurers in the service of the imperialists, such as Pinochet in Latin America or Holden Robert in Africa. There is every indication that the struggle or armed aggression of Cambodia against Vietnam is also encouraged by the Maoist group which dominates China today. As to a war between China and the Soviet Union, this seems an unlikely hypothesis. The Soviet Union, although it defends its frontiers with firmness, pursues a traditional policy of peace and has never ceased to propose to the Chinese leaders, with no response, that a non-aggression pact be signed. As to a

possible aggression by the Chinese, it also seems to me unlikely under current conditions, so great is the economic and technical lag in China in comparison to that of the people which proved capable of defeating the Nazi war machine. Such a war is not therefore inevitable, and is on the contrary unlikely, unless the imperialists want to profit from the border clashes provoked by the Chinese to convert them into a world war.

O GLOBO: Where Western Europe is concerned, does Eurocommunism represent an original path? Can it be transplanted to countries such as Brazil? Or is it merely a matter, as many of its critics say, of a new version of social democracy?

Prestes: It should be borne in mind that the term "Eurocommunism" was coined by the bourgeoisie with a view to attempting to divide the communist movement in Europe. It is an inaccurate and unacceptable term, since Europe does not come down to just the capitalist West, but also includes its socialist half. It is true that some communist parties in Western Europe accept the term as the expression of those common elements they say they have found in the tactics adopted by each. But as they themselves recognize, it is not a matter of something organized with a leadership center, nor of an original path common to all the parties in question, since the differences among them and in the social paths toward socialism adopted by each are so great too. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin said that the paths toward socialism are most varied. And there is no greater error than to seek mechanically to transpose the experience of one country to another, where the revolutionary process is concerned. It would be an exaggeration to say that the communist parties which accept the term "Eurocommunism" adopt it as a new version of social democracy. But it is also true that the bourgeoisie, as we have already said, sought to use it in order to divide the communist movement, in the hope that the Western European parties would become social democratic parties. Which did not in fact occur, as was seen at the Berlin conference of all of the European communist parties--in the capitalist world and the socialist community--where broad common ground was found within the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

O GLOBO: In your view, is the main contradiction in the world today between the capitalist and the socialist countries, or between the poor countries and the rich ones?

Prestes: We are living in an era of transition from capitalism to socialism in the whole world today. This process, despite some temporary setbacks, is taking on an ever-faster rhythm. In recent years the three fascist regimes still existing in Europe--in Portugal, Greece and Spain--fell. The colonial system of the imperialists is tending to disappear completely and the peoples one after another are choosing the path of building a socialist society. Even in our America, the Cuban people, neighbors to the great imperialist power, have already built the new socialist society. However imperialism is resisting, and through direct intervention, as is happening now in Zaire, or by means of military and civilian coups, as is happening in Brazil, is

seeking to halt the advance of the peoples toward socialism, to save capitalism for a time, imposing neocolonialism and neofascism on the dominated peoples. All of this shows what the main contradiction in the world of today truly is--that occurring between the peoples struggling for peace and social progress, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other. It is the struggle between two opposed social systems, the struggle between two adverse trends--the peaceful and the aggressive, a contradiction which is the most concentrated expression of the basic contradiction between labor and capital. The division between poor and rich people, or between one hemisphere and another, between North and South, is designed precisely to conceal on which side the main enemy of all the peoples in the struggle for social progress is to be found. It is designed to define the Soviet Union as a rich country in the Northern Hemisphere, alongside the United States, as another enemy of the peoples struggling for social progress--the Soviet Union which is precisely the certain support on which the peoples who are struggling for complete national independence and for social progress, who yearn to free themselves from the capitalist regimes and to build the new socialist society, can rely today.

O GLOBO: How do you see the future of Latin America? And Carter's human rights policy?

Prestes: The gentlemen in the U.S. monopolies and government say that they will not allow a second Cuba on the American continent, but it is in that direction, toward socialism, that all the peoples of Latin America are advancing inexorably. Capitalism, as the representatives of all the communist and workers' parties in Latin America said at the Havana Conference in June of 1975, is no longer resolving any of the problems of our peoples. They also recognized that the determining factor in Latin America is the increase in the anti-imperialist and national liberation struggles. U.S. imperialism, however, which wants to keep Latin America as its calm rear guard, will continue to make every effort to halt the advance of our peoples toward social progress. It is intensifying the penetration of the monopolies and the fascist threat is growing throughout Latin America. But with the development of capitalism itself, with the emergence of large enterprises, the workers' class is growing and the level of its class awareness is rising. It will be the guiding force of the movement which will lead our peoples to victory in the struggle for national independence, for democracy and for social progress. As to the policy of Carter, who claims to be the defender of human rights, it is obviously denied by the support he continues to give all the dictators and tyrants to be found in Latin America today, from Pinochet to Geisel, Somoza and so many others. But despite this, it cannot be denied that the statements of Carter and some of the positions adopted by the American government have created conditions on the basis of which the development of the struggle for human rights in all of Latin America is becoming easier.

O GLOBO: How do you view Brazilian foreign policy with regard to Africa?



Prestes: Mr Geisel's foreign policy with regard to Africa is an integral part of the economic policy oriented outward and not toward the domestic market, the rate of growth therein being limited by the government through its wage policy. Its purpose is to guarantee the maximum profits for the domestic and foreign monopolies. But in order to win markets in black Africa as it wants to do, the Brazilian government has seen the need to modify the image the African peoples have of it, as a result of the policy pursued by the Brazilian dictatorship of systematically supporting the fascism of Salazar and Caetano at the UN. Thus it decided to devote special concern to the case of Angola, hastening to recognize the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government even before it was definitively established, and despite the vigorous support it obtained from the Soviet Union and socialist Cuba. Dr Silveira's "responsible pragmatism" leads inevitably to such contradictions, but it is in fact the expression in the foreign policy of the Brazilian government of its overall policy, always in the service of the monopolies, the multinational enterprises and U.S. financial capital. The same contradiction also emerges in the effort which the dictatorship, which is anti-Soviet and anti-communist, is making to intensify its trade exchange with the USSR and the other countries in the socialist community.

O GLOBO: And in connection with Africa, how do you view the increasing Cuban participation in African affairs, for example in Angola and Eritrea?

Prestes: I am watching it with keen interest and delight and I applaud it. Cuba is in fact a socialist country. Its government is guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the practice of which includes fraternal support of all the peoples struggling for national liberation and social progress. But it is not just Cuba. It is all the socialist countries which, to the extent that each can, provide support in the most varied ways and in all sectors to the peoples struggling against poverty and backwardness left them by the colonizers. As Fidel Castro has said repeatedly, without the support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the building of socialism in Cuba would not be viable. The support given by the Cuban government to the peoples in Africa struggling for independence and progress is expressed mainly in sending Cuban technicians, doctors, professors and teachers to help them in the huge task confronting them. In the event of armed aggression and at the request of the government involved, as happened in Angola and Ethiopia, this aid is also extended to the military sector, with the participation of detachments of the armed forces of Cuba in combating the foreign aggressors. This is a high and noble gesture which no one could protest except those interested in the massacre of peoples who after centuries of colonial oppression have won national independence and aspire to a new life of freedom and progress. It is not possible therefore to confuse the "Cuban role in African affairs" with the intervention, armed or otherwise, of the imperialists, which is always oriented in precisely the opposite direction.

O GLOBO: What is your current view of the armaments race and detente?

Prestes: Despite the bilateral and multilateral agreements signed in the 1960s and 1970s and, more particularly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which contributed to limiting the armaments race for a time, that race has in recent years taken on increasingly alarming proportions for which the United States government and mainly the current administration of Mr Carter are to blame. I believe moreover that the peoples of the entire world, including the overwhelming majority of the American people, have the strength to limit this dangerous growth. The extraordinary general assembly of the UN convoked on the initiative of the Soviet Union to discuss problems pertaining to world disarmament can contribute greatly to this end. Representatives of 149 countries are participating in it, and from the general debate which is reaching its conclusion, one can see the support of the overwhelming majority for the proposals submitted by the Soviet representatives. Generally speaking they are the following: a halt to production of all types of nuclear weapons, as well as a halt to production and prohibition of all other types of mass-extermination weapons. An end to the creation of new types of conventional weaponry with great destructive power. And, further, rejection of the expansion of armed forces and the increase in conventional weaponry by the powers which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as the countries linked with it by military agreements. It is in fact measures such as these which can make it possible to take immediate steps leading to an end to the armaments race, the only way of consolidating detente, i.e. a relaxation of international tension, and to avoid a return to the cold war, to the dangerous situation in which the peoples of the entire world lived in the years which followed the end of World War II, constantly on the brink of the abyss of a nuclear conflagration. We must recognize that thanks to the policy of the Soviet Union favoring peace and peaceful cooperation, including such important undertakings, among others, as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Helsinki Conference on peace and cooperation involving all the European nations plus the United States and Canada, it has been possible to date, more than 30 years after the end of World War II, to prevent the outbreak of a new world conflict. The brilliant victory of the Vietnamese people, which forced the United States to withdraw its aggressive troops from Indochina and helped the U.S. people to understand the need to struggle against the reactionary forces seeking to lead them into new warlike adventures also contributed to this. The consolidation of international detente is truly the only alternative to the horror of a nuclear war. Under these conditions, an important role in the struggle to consolidate international detente falls to the Brazilian people. It is their duty to wage a battle against the military regime, for democratic freedom, but also for world peace, and against the vast military expenditures being made by the dictatorship and more particularly against the warlike aspects of the nuclear agreement with the FNC, against the efforts of the Brazilian generals to make of our fatherland a new base for the production and storage of nuclear weaponry, beginning by demanding that General Geisel sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponry.

In conclusion, Prestes said that he would not respond to the subsequent questions either, because they had to do with his biography and were thus

"of less importance." And he added: "And also because I have not yet had the time to write my memoirs." Concerning the opinions solicited about a number of historic figures, he said: "My opinions about various Brazilian personalities could lead to polemics, which would be undesirable at this time when we are urging all patriots and progressives to join in unity in the struggle against fascism." (Interview granted to O GLOBO in June 1978)

The questions he declined to answer were: His family, childhood, training? Paternal and maternal influences? Schools attended? Why did he go into the army? What was his military life like? Colleagues and main military friends in that era? What was his view of the Copacabana Fort uprising in 1922? And the 1924 revolt? How would he analyze the so-called "lieutenants" movement of that time today? What link can be made between the founding of the PCB in 1922 and the explosive situation of that time? Why would a military officer who could have had a long and brilliant career in the army, which was his situation at that time, become a revolutionary? What was his experience in the Column? What did he seek to achieve? Had the column been victorious, how would the history of Brazil of that era have been written? Why didn't the population in the interior support the Column more intensively? In what way did the "lieutenants" movement and later the Column contribute to his endorsement of Marxism-Leninism? Would it be possible to give an overview of his personal impressions of some of the main personalities in those events, such as Siqueira Campos, Juarez Tavora, Eduardo Gomes, Cordão de Farias and others? How could some of these same lieutenants and personalities have come to participate later in the 1964 military movement? When Siqueira Campos went to Paraguay in 1927 with 65 of the remaining men in the Column, Mr Prestes went to Bolivia with 620. What was this first period of exile like for him? In what way did it differ from his long years of later exile? What was the importance of his later contacts in Argentina with Rodolfo Ghioldi and other communists, in his adherence to Marxism-Leninism? When did he really feel for the first time that communism was his path? Was this a difficult transition? Was there some initial personal conflict? What were the main events which led to this important decision? After a series of meetings with Mr Prestes, including Juarez Tavora and Siquera Campos as well, the PCB, in 1929, asked him to be a presidential candidate on a platform including nationalization of the land and division of the large estates, nationalization of the industrial firms and banks, abolition of the foreign debt, freedom of organization and the press, the right to strike, legalization of the PCB, the eight-hour labor day, holidays and a wage increase. Why did Mr Prestes refuse? Does he believe that this basic program is still valid in part? What is his view of the 1930 revolution? What transpired at the secret meetings he had then with Getulio Vargas and his secretary of justice in the government of Rio Grande do Sul, Oswaldo Aranha? Was he offered the military leadership of the movement? What was his answer? Now that so much time has passed, does he believe that his attitude was wise? Could he give a rapid overview of his personal opinions about some of the leaders of the era such as Getulio Vargas, Washington Luis, Julio Prestes,

Burgos de Medeiros and others? What was his first experience of life in the Soviet Union like? Why didn't the PCB support the constitutionalist revolution of 1932? Would it be a purely oligarchic movement? Couldn't the New State have been prevented? Could he say something about the creation of the National Liberating Alliance? What were the reasons for the preparations for the 1935 insurrection? How does he assess those events today? Could it have been a political error? How would he describe the rise of fascism in Brazil then? Integralism? Plinio Salgado? How would he describe his experience in prison? How would he describe the New State from the socioeconomic point of view? The PCB totally supported the entry of Brazil into the war against Nazism and Fascism, but later the government which emerged in the postwar years proscribed the PCB. Even so, does he believe that entry into the war was wise? For example, Argentina did not participate, but profited greatly economically from the war. Could he say something about the FEB [Brazilian Expeditionary Force]? The support Prestes gave later to Getulio Vargas, despite all he suffered at the hands of his police, including the episode pertaining to his wife Olga, has always been widely discussed in Brazil. What statement would he make today about all of this? In its 56 years of existence, the PCB has had only 2 years of full legality. What was this experience like, from 1945 to 1947? To what does he attribute the great electoral success of the Communist Party in the elections of that time, when it emerged from its clandestine status to win nine percent of the vote, electing 14 federal deputies (plus 2 later) and Mr Prestes as senator? He himself was elected senator for the Federal District and deputy for Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul and the Federal District. To what point was this success the product of his personal prestige, his image from the days of the Column? What was his parliamentary experience like? In the debates in the Congress, an effort was always made to link his unlimited support of the Soviet Union even to opposing Brazil's interests, and there was even frequent talk of what his position would be in the event of a war between Brazil and the Soviet Union. What were those debates like? Could he say something about his Congressional colleagues of that era, such as Juracy Magalhaes, Luis Vianna, Hermes Lima, Daniel Faraco, Prado Kelly and others? Why did he and the PCB propose to enter the presidential elections with their own candidate, in the person of Yldio Pinza, even chosen outside the party cadres? Why did they not support the candidacy of Brig Gen Eduardo Gomes? Wouldn't PCB support of the UDN have prevented a certain portion of the middle class and the anti-fascist liberals from adopting a more rightist attitude in the future? On 7 May 1947 the PCB was made illegal again by Dutra. How did it come to be placed "outside the law" again? Did this prove that those who said the Communist Party should not insist on the legal and democratic path, on the electoral strategy, were right? In August 1950 Mr Prestes issued a rather radical manifesto which was harshly criticized. What is his statement about that manifesto? Why did the PCB, which supported Getulio Vargas in 1945, abstain from the 1950 electoral campaign? In his view, was PCB opposition to this second Vargas government proper? What is his version of the events which led to the suicide and letter testament of Getulio Vargas, in which he even denounced imperialist pressures? How did the 20th Congress of the CPSU which



criticized Stalin and the personality cult affect the PCB? How does he view the Juscelino Kubitschek government in a Brazilian historical context? Does he believe that the support the PCB gave the candidacy of Marshal Lott was correct? How would he analyze the short government term of Janio Quadros and his resignation? How did the PCB view his foreign policy? Could Mr Prestes give a rapid overview of the main personalities of the 1964 period, such as Brizola, Carlos Lacerda, Adhemar de Barros, Magalhaes Pinto, Joao Goulart, Castelo Branco, Arraes, Mourao Filho, and others?

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INTERVIEW WITH PCB CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY GREGORIO BEZERRA

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 13 Jul 79 p 15

[Interview with Gregorio Bezerra by Giulietto Chiesa: "The Road Democracy Must Travel in Brazil"]

[Text] Gregorio Bezerra has been a member of the PCB [Brazilian Communist Party] since 1930. He has spent 23 years of his life in prison, at various times. In 1945, he was a deputy to the Constituent National Assembly. He underwent severe torture in the regime's prisons. In 1969, he was exchanged for the American Ambassador, Herberg, who had been kidnaped and he was expelled from the country. He lived in exile in Mexico, in Cuba and, finally, in the Soviet Union, where he now lives. From 1948 to 1964, he devoted all his political activity to organizing rural unions and he acquired a great reputation in the country as a peasant leader. The volume "Memorias" [Memories], which constitutes the first part of his biography, was published in Brazil by Civilizacao Brasileira. Currently he holds the post of secretary of mass labor in the PCB Central Committee.

On the occasion of the International Conference for Amnesty in Brazil, which was held in Rome and on which this newspaper has reported extensively, there arrived in Italy a delegation of the Brazilian Communist Party, led by Comrade Armenio Guedes, of the Executive Committee, and made up of Comrade Gregorio Bezerra and Hercules Correa, of the Central Committee.

Shortly before the beginning of the conference, we asked Comrade Bezerra to tell us what he thought of the Brazilian situation.

Comrade Bezerra, even before responding to our questions, wanted to express the gratitude of the Brazilian Communist Party to the Italian communists and to the democratic forces of our country for the contribution they have made toward the implementation of the Conference for Amnesty in Brazil. "It is an initiative which could constitute a decisive step at least toward obtaining a limited amnesty," he commented, "even if we, and with us a large group of

Brazilian democratic forces, fight for a broad amnesty, with no restrictions."

On the very day of the opening of the conference, in fact, the regime, led today by Joao Batista Figueredo, announced the presentation to the Assembly of a bill for limited amnesty which, in part only, meets the demands of the opposition and which completely avoids the problem of a real democratization of Brazil.

Comrade Bezerra insists on emphasizing that "it is not possible to speak of democratization as long as the right to act in full legality has not been granted to the PCB and to the other parties." There seems to be no doubt that there is still a long road to travel before obtaining this result; however--we asked--it seems that something is moving within the political and social groups which support the regime; in the direction, for instance, of an attempt at a gradual and controlled opening, from within, which would eliminate the more brutal and repressive aspects.

Comrade Bezerra confirms these impressions even if he explains their origin in a profound process of weakening of the dictatorship. "The so-called opening is a real fact; Institutional Act No 5, which constituted the regime's support and allowed all arbitration, has been abolished; the press has begun to publish the names of the torturers and of the murderers and it can denounce the crimes committed by the authorities without the mechanism of censorship being set off. The breaches in the system of repression are many by now and we are working to widen them, but--the old communist leader emphasizes with great vigor--in all this, there is no spontaneity: the fact is that the dictatorship is suffering from progressive attrition and this, in its turn, is the result of a growing opposition movement which pervades the entire country."

Comrade Bezerra cites as an example the question of the broad amnesty which has seen a very large group of democratic forces coalesce. Around this watchword, which the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement], the sole legal opposition party, has made its own, there has been mobilized not only the union movement and the student movement, but even the Order of Lawyers, a large part of the Association of the Brazilian Press, sectors of the national industry, those not tied to the multinationals and to the United States and the vast panorama of the progressive forces of the Catholic Church.

We asked him, on this point, for more explanations. "Up to 1964, the Church had supported the coup leaders, but since then many things have changed. Today, it is the same hierarchy that openly condemns the crimes and the tortures; without exaggerating, one can say that currently the Church is in the vanguard of the defense of the peasants thrown off their land, the "boias frias," more than 8 million peasants uprooted from the country by the regime's agrarian policy. The union organizations in the country are strongly influenced by the Church, and they are influenced precisely in an anti-imperialistic sense, against the multinationals which, after all, dictate laws on matters of agrarian policy, even to the government."

We asked Comrade Bezerra about the situation of the working class; he answered us that some of the most important innovations are on this side.

"After the strike of December 1978, declared by the metallurgical union of greater Sao Paulo, another boost has been given to the regime by the strike this March. The government reacted by proclaiming the strike illegal and replacing the union leadership outright with men of its persuasion. But it was a mistake. The strike continued; the minister of labor, Murilo Macedo, had to deal with the old union leadership and, after asking for a truce, he had to free the workers and the union leaders who had been arrested. The government had to close the question with an absolutely unheard-of step: it paid 50 percent of the wages lost, while the remaining 50 percent was reimbursed by the companies. Not even at the time of the democratic parenthesis of Joao Goulart had such important results been obtained; and it is necessary to keep in mind that the strike had obviously taken on political dimensions, including in its platform the recognition of the right to strike, to union freedom, to the broadening of democratic freedoms and of full amnesty without restrictions."

But the party continues to be compelled to clandestine work and the regime's repression even seems to be concentrated precisely against the Brazilian communists. Comrade Bezerra confirms these facts. "From 1973 to 1977, we suffered terrible blows. The dictatorship attributed its first electoral defeat, that of 1974, to our work. It is true that we were the only national force which had maintained an organization, especially in the cities; it is also true that we greatly influenced the outcome of the election; it is not true, however, that we were the ones who determined the result; it was the peasant and urban masses who made of the vote an arm of struggle to reject the dictatorship."

Was it in the regime's interest, then, to attribute to the communist propaganda its political defeat? "Exactly, this constituted the pretext to launch an attack against us. From 1974 to 1976, ten leaders of the national leadership were killed; some 20 were arrested and convicted. The party suffered the hardest blow in its history and, if the balance-sheet has not been even more tragic, it is because the decision to leave the country was taken. It was during this period that Comrade Carlos Prestes, the secretary of the party, took, along with others, the life of exile. Nevertheless," Bezerra continued, "we did not surrender: our work advanced in a thousand ways and now the party's prestige is higher than ever before. The extraordinary electoral result of the MDB in the 1978 elections themselves, to which we contributed and in which the opposition approved by the regime obtained approximately 5 million more votes than ARENA [National Renewal Alliance], the government's party, demonstrates the power which exists. Naturally, as you know, the electoral law has allowed the ARENA to have an equal majority in the Assembly. But the political result remains, in all its clarity."

The conversation was now coming to a close. We asked Comrade Bezerra for a forecast for the future. He answered, with a smile, that the struggle would still be long. "In the short term, the dictatorship does not seem destined to fall: it still has much support abroad and within, especially in the army. But personally, I am optimistic. The opposition is growing; repression is more difficult; our work does not stop, through the unity of all the democratic forces against the dictatorship."



## CURRENT SITUATION WITHIN PCB DISCUSSED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 27 Jun 79 pp 28-32

[Text] With amnesty, the curtain falls on another of the false national questions: the one to the effect that the government can cause the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) to disappear. Fifteen years of vigilance, arrests and disappearances show that repression can cause the Communist Party momentarily to withdraw its line of command to Europe, but it is impossible to make it disappear. Consequently, the real question is not to know whether it exists or not, but whether it should exist legally or clandestinely.

Fifty-seven years old and founded by workers and intellectuals in Rio de Janeiro, the PCB enjoyed legal status for only 2 years, from 1945 to 1947, when it succeeded in getting a bloc of 12 federal deputies and Senator Luis Carlos Prestes. Outlawed during the Dutra administration, it hibernated in cycles and from the Kubitschek administration (1956-1961) to 1964, it achieved semilegality, even publishing an official journal titled NOVOS RIMOS. Persecuted following the fall of Goulart, the PCB maintained its clandestine network in Brazil despite the departure of its eternal secretary general to Moscow, the legendary Captain Luis Carlos Prestes.

The Third Amnesty: Now with the debate on the amnesty plan, the communists become a sort of geographic divider of the measure. All the adversaries of the government who are to the right of the PCB, such as the incontinent members of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) and the corrupt members of the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) gain pardon without much trouble. Those who are to the left, such as the dissidents of the Communist Party itself and the armed organizations, will have to consult the military courts. And what of Prestes' comrades? Well, they all gain the right to travel around the country, beginning with the secretary general himself, sentenced to 14 years in jail by the military courts.

Last week, an authoritative military aide from Planalto Palace was discussing that question quite naturally: "There are several communists in the country," said the official. "They are known; they meet, talk with whomever they wish and there are no problems with them; in the same way, there will not be any problems with the return of Prestes and other communists in exile." What

would happen if there were a banquet in honor of Prestes? "Nothing." And if he calls a press conference? "No problem," said the aide. "The government is granting amnesty. If it is taking that measure, it is obvious that it does not plan to arrest anybody."

For former Army Captain Luis Carlos Prestes, now on the eve of receiving his third amnesty, after being a recipient in 1930 and 1945, the possible reappearance on the political scene is much more complicated. Last week, ill, on the eve of a cataract operation, he left Moscow for a stay on the Black Sea. However, one of his spokesmen declared in Paris that there is "no plan for the immediate return" of the exiled communists. Formally, the PCB has decided that Prestes and the other leaders can travel only after a not negligible question is clarified: considering the current national security law that covers the political activity of the communists (providing 1 to 2 years in jail for attempting to reorganize a proscribed party), would every active communist be arrested?

On the newstands--Up to now, the answer seemed to be definitely affirmative. But toward the end of last week, a short conversation by reporter Carlos Alberto Sardenberg of VEJA with a military minister suggests that an old plan of the communists--to gain legal status for the PCB--may receive a less intransigent response from the government:

"Mr Minister, as a result of the amnesty, communist exiles who will never cease to work for the reorganization of their party are returning. Will they be arrested," asked the reporter

"No, not that. The amnesty is sincere," he explained.

"Does that mean that the communists will be able to be politically active?"

"They will. The only thing they cannot do is to engage in subversive acts as stipulated in the national security law?"

"For example?"

"Teach the overthrow of the regime. Act in behalf of the overthrow of the regime."

"Outside of that, they can meet, discuss and even ask for the legalization of the Communist Party?"

"The communists are a reality. We have to coexist with them. As the Communist Party, a party that does not preach the seizure of power by force can exist in that regard can very well exist. Acting democratically, it can operate."

"Would a campaign for the legalization of the PCB arouse a reaction? Of what type?"

"It is obvious that many people are not going to like it. There will be concern in the military area. But with time, that will be absorbed, as long as the communists do not set fire to the circus, of course. They cannot engage in subversion. But if they understand that there is a new reality, then everything will go well. Pretty soon that paper of theirs...will appear legally on the newstands."

"Which one?"

"That...O TRABALHO...? The VOZ DO TRABALHO...?"

"The VOZ OPERARIA?"

"Yes, that's it."

"On the newstands? You think the paper is going to come out?"


"Look here, I am not announcing that. But it will end up by coming out. Or don't you think so?"

For Democracy: What remains to be learned is what the PCB wants to do with the circus. It has changed in recent years, especially after the severe persecution it suffered in the summer of 1975, when its clandestine network was uncovered by the military security services and the secret printing press that printed VOZ OPERARIA in Rio was captured and destroyed, while half of the Central Committee, 23 persons, disappeared without a trace. The newspaper, which is usually published in eight pages and appears approximately once a month, did not come out again until April of the following year, when the communist leaders established a nucleus in Paris after temporarily deactivating the clandestine network in the country. The first issue of the new phase included a tribute to seven members of the Central Committee--the leading group in the party (see the accompanying organization charts)--who had disappeared.

Normally, the secretariats are: Political (exercised by the secretary general); Organization; Union Affairs; Agitation and Propaganda; Finance; Education; Foreign Affairs; Rural Affairs.

One of the principal PCB leaders former Deputy Marco Antonio Coelho, became the most important war trophy of the security organs, which arrested him, and he was expelled from the party for having made confessions to his captors. Coelho, who denounced the tortures he suffered in prison is free and living in Sao Paulo and today is a sort of embodiment of the ethical dilemma surrounding judgment of the behavior of political prisoners.

Beginning in 1977, reflecting appreciable changes of behavior by the communist hierarchy, VOZ OPERARIA began to refer to the leaders and best known members by their real names and surnames, in signed articles, interviews and even debates of ideas. Before that, only historical names appeared in the paper,



such as that of Prestes or of the Pernambucan Gregorio Bezerra. But gradually one was able to read the opinions of Anita Leocadia Prestes, the eldest daughter of the secretary general, who bears the name of her mother who died in a Nazi concentration camp; of the former Deputy Hercules Correia and Luis Tenorio de Lima, former union leaders banished since 1964; of Jusimar Teixeira, A. Guedes, presumably Zuleika Alembert, and Jaime dos Santos. In December 1977 something else new was detected, this time in the doctrinal area. In a short text published under the neutral caption "Ideas," the *VOZ OPERARIA* advised that "for us, democracy is not a transitory stage which we would take advantage of to prepare the establishment of a formally antidemocratic type of class domination. On the contrary, democracy is a permanent principle of our activity."

The Seventh Congress: After the virtual immobilization of its machinery, the PCB--which General Ferdinando de Carvalho, in Military Police Inquiry (IP4) 479 to 1946 estimated was composed of "30,000 activists"--appears to be inclined for the first time in its 57-year history openly to plumb the depths of the exchange of opinions in public.

That concept of democracy as a permanent value has not yet become official. There is not even an indication that the majority of the leaders agrees with that profession of democratic faith. It is known that at least one of the three trends into which the Brazilian communists are divided maintains that



that is the course. A possible revision of the principle of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," an expression of Lenin's which all the communist parties in the whole world repeat as a golden rule of their socialist plan, would respond to all the doubts of the military minister, who last week speculated on the behavior of Brazilian communists.

But there are no signs that the PCB is disposed to discuss such an explosive matter while it is fighting for its legalization. In a recent interview with the weekly MOVIMENTO, Prestes announced the holding of a party congress, which would be only the seventh in an almost 60-year history. He says that what is of interest at the moment is to discuss the events that have marked his organization since 1967, when the last congress met. And he promised to bring out the "platform we will advocate after the defeat of the dictatorship." Not a word on doctrine. Meanwhile, the Communist Party believes that not only has its influence increased but that "if it gained a party slate, it would get from 15 to 18 percent of the votes in the country, with 20 percent of the vote in Rio, Sao Paulo, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul.

The influence of so-called "Eurocommunism," however, does not appear to be restricted to small notes in VOZ OPEARIA. From their base in Paris, the communists early this year extended a bridge in the direction of the Italian Communist Party, the most daring advocate of the "democratic" strategy in the community of European communist parties. There is a PCB office in Rome, established by Salomao Malina, one of the leaders who emerged from underground to speed up the campaign for legalization. A decorated fighter of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during the campaign in Italy in the World War II, Malina, 57 years old, defined the current dilemma of the PCB with surprising frankness: "Our political survival is linked to the possibility of working legally in the eighties."

For one who spent the last 5 years fighting to at least survive, the change of inflection is suggestive. Its achievement, however, does not depend merely on a possible incorporation of the ideas gathered during the European exile. As Prestes recognizes in his recent interview with regard to the problems that the PCB accumulated since 1964, "we overestimated our strength and underestimated that of the enemy." And since the "enemy" is in power, the restoration depends on it--and it is certainly not automatically granted by the amnesty law.

The Command: The Brazilian communists may have changed in 15 years. But in addition to not having ceased to be communists, they continue to form an organization capable of absorbing some liberal winds, at the same time that they practice faithful orthodoxy with regard to Moscow: the PCB, for example, was one of the first communist parties in the world to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even so, the surprising proclamation of a sort of legality in exile causes that party to exist in a different form, with more names known other than those of Prestes and the mysterious underground code-names.

In Brazil, however, the clandestine network continues to operate under secret rules. Even so, it is believed that the organization has increased its strength among student circles, which had weakened since 1968. It is estimated that the Communist Party had one of the largest blocs in the last National Students Union (UNV) Congress in Salvador. In addition, it has reportedly succeeded in improving its positions in the Sao Paulo unions, and some of its most respected members, such as architect Oscar Niemeyer, already permit themselves to make bold statements. In December, in closing a National Meeting for Democracy organized by the Democratic Brazil Center, which he heads, the architect lamented that his friend Luis Carlos Prestes was not in the hall in the Hotel Nacional in Rio.

We cannot tell if Prestes will return to Brazil. It is not even known if the announced Seventh PCB Congress will be held in exile despite the guarantee of a leader who lives in Europe. We cannot guarantee that Prestes will return as the all-powerful leader of the Communist Party. As has happened for 20 years, one of the favorite discussions of the PCB and its appendages is the replacement of Prestes because of age, health or death. A few years ago that question seemed to have been resolved with the elevation of the Sergipe native Giocondo Dias. However, the dismantling of the clandestine network forced Giocondo to fly to Paris and Prestes to retake the reins.

Now, although groups are identified within the PCB, little information comes out as, for example, the murmur of the unexpected ostracism of the young presumptive heir to Prestes whose code-name is "Marcelo." Some believe that Dias may possibly be elevated again. Others believe that Salim Malina, legalized in Rome, is equally well placed. There is also the possibility of better-known personalities being elevated, such as Marrules Correia, or even some of the new names of the VOZ OPERARIA, a paper that is not on the newsstands and for the time being the simple possession of its pages can lead a reader to jail.

#### Old Links or Risks After 70

The country's bookstores have been displaying and selling well a growing collection of books written by known members of the PCB, active, retired or even frankly disenchanted with the organization in which they once belonged. Almost all of them are over 70 years old and it is not a coincidence: following a tendency detected some time ago in other countries, the Brazilian regime has shown itself more and more tolerant of old communists. As for the young members, it is still advisable to keep their ideas and revelations for clandestine meetings.

Preserved by that strange law of septuagenarians, some historic relics of the PCB have been publishing their depositions for posterity. In certain cases, they vie for the preference of the readers with some already classic works written by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci and other thinkers, the latter by the way also riding in the best seller lists. Last year, thousands of

readers bought copies of books such as "Combats and Battles," by Octavio Brandao (83 years old); "Form in Architecture," by Oscar Niemeyer (71); or "My Life and the Struggles of My Time," by Elias Chaves Neto (81).

**Conditions Lacking:** This year, the republishing of "The Knight of Hope," by the quasi-septuagenarian Jorge Amado, was followed by the "Memoires" of Gregorio Bezerra. Seventy-eight years old, beaten up in the streets of Recife in 1964, Bezerra remains firmly attached to the ideas that attracted him to the PCB in his youth. Exiled in Moscow since 1969, he made a categorical profession of faith during a recent interview: "If I had to start again, I would do everything all over again. An even more, because now I have more experience"; experience and discipline, as he showed in the course of the interview.

"We do not see conditions for the establishment of a socialist regime in Brazil," he admitted, faithful to Prestes. With regard to Stalin, whose crimes he condemns, he expressed the reservation that he was "the man who consolidated the Soviet socialist state." The view of the world adopted by Bezerra appears clearly in the first volume of his "Memoires." The second, if Bezerra wants, could be concluded in Brazil: he is one of the most famous future beneficiaries of amnesty.

#### Under Control Despite Being Underground

Just as the communist parties protect militarily the intelligence about their operation, the governments that pursue them hid what they know about them. Even so, permanently watched by national and foreign intelligence services, the Brazilian Communist Party has already generated a reasonable official literature. The best known works included in it are the books of General Ferdinando de Carvalho, who headed IPM 479 in 1964, in which the activities of the communists were investigated. Less known, for example, are the periodic reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, which keeps abreast of the situation of all the communist parties in the world for the American Government. According to the CIA report for 1963, the strength of the PCB among the students and workers was more apparent than real; more noisy than mobilizing. The following year, the facility with which the Goulart government was deposed showed that the CIA, unlike Luis Carlos Prestes, did not overestimate the strength of the communists.

Followed and eavesdropped on in Brazil and abroad by agents of the government intelligence services, the PCB in its 57 years of existence has suffered heavy losses. At least one of its most important leaders collaborated with the police in 1937, according to the deposition of the writer Graciliano Ramos in "Memoires From Jail." Adauto Alves dos Santos, one of Luis Carlos Prestes' closest collaborators, regretted being a member and in December 1972 produced confessions published by the press in which he revealed some of the party's international connections.

**Proof of Competence:** Between 1973 and 1976, a period during which the PCB suffered the severest attack in its history, four of its leaders,

according to depositions in exile, went through episodes worthy of the most refined intrigue of fiction. Hidden under false names and in homes they never went to in the company of anyone, the four were intercepted a short distance from their doors by persons who claimed to be Americans who offered them "help in case of necessity." Along with the offer, the citizen offered two telephone numbers: one in Rio, in case of a contact in Brazil, and the other in West Germany, in case they wanted to meet him abroad.

It was not exactly help but an invitation to collaborate reinforced by the demonstration of strength--and competence--offered by the fact of the strange citizen showing his knowledge not only of the real identity of the person he was speaking to--something that other members of the PCB sometimes do not know--but also their secret address. The four leaders did not return to their homes, not even to pick up personal items. One of them, former Deputy Joao Massena, disappeared months later and, according to the PCB, was murdered. The other three got away from their company, headed for the alternative branches of the clandestine network and gradually reappeared in East Europe.

Since the Brazilian intelligence services are not under the jurisdiction of laws that compel periodic release of secret documents declassified by time, little or nothing is known beyond what is kept in trial records, into which goes only what is not interest to the interrogators. Even so, a document of the War College (ESC), written in 1970 by then Navy Captain Luiz Ferreira and entitled "The Left in Brazil," shows that the Brazilian Government keeps the PCB under much more professional vigilance that may be supposed by the simple reading of propaganda texts.

Grain of Sand: The report, a study produced in the intelligence course, contains a brief history of the PCB and, in the very midst of the Medici administration, warned: "Current factors (...) lend themselves to another attempt at regimentation of the union masses by the PCB, which raises as its battle flag what it calls 'the decline of the purchasing power of the working masses.'" According to the report, the study prepared in this regard was aimed mainly at the "metalworkers sector of Guanabara, Santos, Sao Vicente, Cubatao, Osasco; in the latter, their leadership actually fell into the hands of the PCB."

The study by Commander Ferreira, as well as other works pertaining to the operation of the PCB, does not offer any guarantees as to the exactness of their ideological identifications. It says, for example, that Darcy Ribeiro, former minister of education, Evandro Lins e Silva, former justice of the federal supreme court, as well as newspaperman Mauritonio Veira were members of the PCB during the Goulart administration. The conduct of those people as well as the attacks that the PCB made against them discredit that suspicion. They could be prodigious cases of feigning but in that possibility the proof necessary for the charge is lacking.



Errors of that kind, even attaining the credibility of charges, however, are not sufficient to condemn the quality of these works as a whole. After all, they are not committed only by Brazilian observers. The American Professor Ronald Chilcote, author of "The Brazilian Communist Party," without preoccupations common to the security service officials, committed the error of listing the journalist and former Deputy Hermanno Alves as a communist, which is a grain of sand if compared to a report written in the United States and collected in the files of a Brazilian intelligence service. Its title: "Henry Kissinger Is a Russian Agent."

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